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Escalating the Struggle Against
Taft-Hartley Contemnors
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Ian D. Lanofft
With the exception of the delay syndrome that characterizes the administration of the Labor-Management Relations Act,' the principal
stumbling block to effectuating the national labor policy is the inability
of the National Labor Relations Board to formulate effective remedies.&2
f Professor of Law, Wayne State University.

T Member

of the Illinois Bar.
1 29 U.S.C. §§ 158 et seq. (1970). For a presentation of the position that institutionalized
delay is the major obstacle to vigorous Taft-Hartley enforcement, see Bartosic, Labor Law

Reform-The NLRB and a Labor Court, 4 GA. L. REv. 647, 650-55 (1970).
2 Commentators and committee reports have emphasized that additional remedies are
essential to enforce the substantive provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act. See, e.g., Brown,
Exploring the World of Remedies, in SouTrrwFRsmN LEGAL FOUNDATION, LABOR LAW
DI)E-OPMENTs 69 (1968); McCulloch, New Remedies Under the National Labor Relations
Act, in NEw Yoa UNIvERSrrY TwENTY-IRST ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR PROCTERDINGS
223 (1969); High, Recent Innovationsin Remedial Orders of the NLRB, PRAcrIcuNG LAWYER,
Mar., 1969, at 87; McCulloch, Past,Present and Future Remedies Under Section 8(a)(5) of
the NLRA, 19 LAB. LJ.131 (1968); St. Antoine, A Touchstone for Labor Board Remedies,
14 WAYNE L. Rzv. 1039 (1968); Schlossberg & Silard, The Need for a Compensatory Remedy
in Refusal-to-Bargain Cases, 14 WAYNE L. REv. 1059 (1968); Comment, Forced Concession
as a Possible NLRB Remedy, 68 CoLuM. L. REv. 1192 (1968); Note, Labor Law-Remedies
-An Assessment of the Proposed "Make-Whole" Remedy in Refusal-to-Bargain Cases, 67
MxcH. L. REv. 374 (1968); Note, Toward Remedying Deliberate Unfair Labor Practices
Under § 8(a) of the NLRA: An Inquiry into the Pathology of the Wilful Violator, 17
U.C.L.L. REv. 602 (1970); Note, Remedies for Employer Unfair Labor PracticesDuring
Union Organizing Campaigns, 77 YALE L.J. 1574 (1968). See also SECIAL SuacoM.s. ON
LABOR OF THE HousE Comm. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONs Act
....90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); StmcoMM. ON NLRB
REsmmEs: THE UNrLFIILED PROMI
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Despite its broad statutory authority,3 the Board's remedial measures
have not proved adequate in coping with recalcitrant employers and
unions, 4 and attempts to fashion and invoke imaginative remedies have
often met with resistance.5
Little attention has been paid to what is potentially the most powerful remedy, the institution of contempt proceedings in a federal court
of appeals when it appears that a respondent is violating a court-enforced Board order. 6 The contempt citation as the ultimate sanction is
crucial to the regulatory scheme of the Act because it portends that the
coercive force of the state will be brought to bear on the contemnor.
If the governing body of law hinders effective adjudication of contempt,
or if judicial or administrative attitudes and procedures prevent its
efficient utilization, then the pinion of the Act has been loosened.
It is particularly appropriate to examine the contempt remedy at this
time. The Board, which for years evinced minimal interest in initiating
contempt proceedings, seems to have recently rediscovered this option,
and the courts appear more willing than formerly to adjudge responOF THE HOUSE COMMa.ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, ADMINISTRATION OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS Acr By NLRB, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print 1961).

3 Section 10(c) of the Labor-Management Relations Act provides that the Board may
require any person found to have committed an unfair labor practice "to take such
affirmative action ... as will effectuate the policies of this subchapter." 29 U.S.C. § 160(c)
(1970). The Supreme Court has construed the remedial power of the Board to be a "broad
discretionary one, subject to limited judicial review." Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v.
NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
4 Perhaps the most notorious recidivist has been J. P. Stevens & Co., whose companywide history of extensive unfair labor practices is reflected by the twelve cases involving
the company decided during the five-year period 1966-71. See J.P. Stevens & Co., 190
N.L.R.B. No. 139, 77 L.R.R.M. 1333 (1971), and cases cited therein.
6 H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970), for example, held that a company,
although twice found to have bargained in bad faith by refusing to accede to a checkoff
to frustrate agreement, could not be ordered to grant the checkoff. Retail Clerks Local
1401 v. NLRB, 79 L.R.R.M. 2984 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Ex-Cell-O Corp. v. NLRB, 449 F.2d
1058 (D.C. Cir. 1971); and United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 430 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1970), held
that the Board properly refused "make-whole" bargaining reimbursement orders since
the legality of the employers' refusals to bargain rested on factually debatable questions
and the employers did not seek unnecessarily to delay the final outcome of the disputes.
In Tiidee Products, Inc., 194 N.L.R.B. No. 198, 79 L.R.R.M. 1175 (1972), an employer
whose refusal to bargain with a newly certified union was a clear and flagrant violation
was ordered to reimburse the Board and the union for expenses incurred in the investigation, preparation, presentation, and conduct of cases at the Board and court levels, but
the employer was not ordered to reimburse the union for preelection expenses and alleged loss of initiation fees and dues; a "make-whole" bargaining reimbursement order
was also denied.
6 The Board's orders are not self-enforcing, nor may the Board impose sanctions for
noncompliance; instead, it must seek court enforcement and have violators held in contempt of the court's decree. Labor-Management Relations Act § 10(e), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)
(1970).
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dents in contempt. In general, contempt is a sanction to which the Board
has infrequently resorted. Until 1964, the peak years were 1941, 1942,
and 1943. In 1941 and 1943, the Board filed contempt petitions in fifteen
and thirteen cases, respectively, 7 and in 1942, eleven cases were decided,
five were settled, and ten were pending adjudication.8 The next twenty
years were a period of remarkable inactivity. While unfair labor practice
cases and court decrees continued to increase in number (and there is
nothing to indicate a decrease in the incidence of violation of decrees),
the Board filed, on the average, only three contempt cases per year and
none at all in 1946, 1948, 1949, and 1955. 9 Beginning in 1964, the number of petitions dramatically increased: fourteen in 1964, twelve in 1965,
eighteen in 1966, twenty in 1967, twenty in 1968, twenty-three in 1969,
twenty in 1970, and seventeen in 1971.10
The Board's reluctance to institute contempt proceedings can no
doubt be attributed in large part to the frequently hostile treatment
accorded the Board in the courts of appeals.1 ' Yet there are signs that
this is changing. In the eleven years following 1938, which saw the
7 6 NLRtB ANN. REP. 101 (1942); 8 NLRB ANN. REP. 177-78 (1944). Years referred to
are fiscal years, which end June 30.
8 7 NLRB ANN. REP. 150-51 (1943).
9 Compiled from
with those for two
Board unfair labor
and the number of

NLRB ANN. REP. It is interesting to compare the statistics for 1943
representative years, 1954 and 1962, with regard to the number of
practice cases on docket, the number of outstanding court decrees,
contempt petitions filed:

Cases on Docket
Outstanding Decrees
Petitions Filed

1943

1954

1962

5,177
411
13

8,634
1,234
4

17.943
1,895
3

SouRcEs: 8 NLRB ANN. Ru'. 62, 84, 177-78 (1944); 19 NLRB ANN. RuEP. 139, 155, 175
(1955); 27 NLRB ANN. REP. 252, 259, 280 (1963).
10

1964
Cases on Docket
Outstanding Decrees
Petitions Filed

1965

1966

1967

20,805 21,531
2,247 2,418
14
12

22,245
2,600
18

23,698
2,806
20

1968

1969

25,154 26,028
3,007 3,307
20
23

1970

1971

28,127 32,046
3,484
3,807
20
17

SouRcas: 29 NLRB ANN. REP. 139, 167, 201 (1965); 30 NLRB ANN. RE. 148, 177, 212
(1966); 31 NLRB ANN. REP. 157, 183, 222 (1967); 32 NLRB ANN. REP. 183, 215, 254 (1968);
33 NLRB ANN. RuP. 172, 200, 240 (1969); 34 NLRB ANN. REP. 169, 196, 236 (1970); ltter
from John C. Truesdale, Acting Executive Secretary, NLRB, to the authors, Apr. 21, '1972
(copy on file at The University of Chicago Law Review) [hereinafter dted as Truesdale
Letter].
11 See text and notes at notes 136-61 infra.
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first contempt case under the Act, 12 fifty cases were decided by the
courts, with the Board prevailing in thirty-six cases-seventy-two percent. 18 In the next decade, the Board was less successful: from 1950
to 1959, there were adjudications of contempt in twenty-one of the
thirty-two cases-sixty-six percent. 14 But from 1960 through 1971, the
Board has been accorded more hospitable treatment: respondents
were held in contempt in seventy-two of the eighty-two cases-eightyeight percent. And in 1970 and 1971, the Board prevailed in twenty-one
of the twenty-three decided cases.1 5
The import of these statistics depends, of course, upon many variables, including the nature of the cases the Board has chosen to file.
Nonetheless, the Board is meeting with more real success in that the
courts are deciding more sophisticated and more complex issues more
frequently in the Board's favor than in previous years. 16 This article
will examine the adequacy of the contempt proceeding as it has traditionally been utilized and will identify the changes needed to adapt it
to a more active role in vindicating the law. The procedures and rules
developed by the Board and the courts will be outlined, with emphasis
upon the procedural rights of the charging party and the alleged
contemnor. Finally, the effectiveness of these procedures and rules
will be evaluated in order to identify dysfunctional characteristics and
17
to recommend reforms.
12 NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., 97 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1938).
13 Compiled from NLRB ANN. REP. This not unimpressive statistic must be discounted
somewhat. Despite the newness of the law and the corresponding uncertainty of its
prescriptions, courts exhibited a tendency to decide the cases without written opinion.
Only fourteen of the thirty-six contempt cases won by the Board were reported. The
efficacy of proceeding in contempt therefore might have appeared less than it really
was.
14 Compiled from NLRB ANN. REP. Fifteen of the cases in which the Board prevailed

and nine dismissals of its petitions were reported.
15 Compiled from NLRB ANN. REP. and Truesdale Letter, supra note 10. While eight
of the ten dismissals appeared in opinion form, only thirty-two of the seventy-two contempt adjudications have been reported.
16 See, e.g., NLRB v. Teamsters Local 676, 450 F.2d 413 (3d Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Amalgamated Local 355, 77 L.R.R.M. 3082 (2d Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Indianapolis Transit Mix
Corp., 77 L.R.R.M. 2979 (7th Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Service Roofing Co., 77 L.R.R.M. 2962
(9th Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Nickey Chevrolet Sales, Inc., 76 L.R.R.M. 2849 (7th Cir. 1971);
NLRB v. Ralph Printing & Lithographing Co., 433 F.2d 1058 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 925 (1971); NLRB v. Kohler Co., 351 F.2d 798 (D.C. Cir. 1965). Good faith is
less frequently an effective defense in civil contempt. See, e.g., NLRB v. Fairview Hosp.,
443 F.2d 1217 (7th Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Crown Laundry & Dry Cleaners, 437 F.2d 290 (5th
Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Ralph Printing & Lithographing Co., supra. Closer scrutiny of
masters' reports is observable. See, e.g., NLRB v. Nickey Chevrolet Sales, Inc., supra;
NLRB v. Operating Eng'rs Local 825, 430 F.2d 1225 (3rd Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
976 (1971); NLRB v. My Store, Inc., 345 F.2d 494 (7th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Kohler Co.,
supra.

17 The source of some of the data and conclusions in this article, particularly in sec-
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I.

THE BOARD DECISION TO SEEK CoNTEMPT

Although the procedure for instituting contempt proceedings is not
specified in either the Taft-Hartley Act or the Board's Rules and Regulations, guidelines have been established.:' In a 1967 memorandum,
the General Counsel directed the regional offices to report promptly to
the central office in Washington every charge filed against a respondent
"named in or subject to an outstanding decree," to investigate the
charge speedily, and to file a follow-up report with recommendations. 9
Prior to 1967, the regional offices were required to refer to the
Washington central office only "meritorious" charges relating to an outstanding court decree. The initial step was thus within the discretion
of the regional office. The 1967 memorandum, shifting the discretion to
Washington, instructed the regions that a "prima facie" case for a
recommendation to the Board for the institution of contempt proceedings would be indicated in two situations: (1) where an outstanding
decree literally covers the new violation, even though the violation "is
not wholly like or does not grow out of the offense or dispute in the
basic case," 20 or (2) where a new Board order or court decree "would
add nothing affirmatively or negatively to an already outstanding decree." 2' A contempt recommendation is not warranted, however, if the
evidence of a violation is not "clear and convincing" 2 or if "application
of the Board's expertise rather than the unsophisticated approach of a
23
special master would more likely afford relief."
tions I and IV, is the personal observations and experience of one of the authors as an

attorney in the Appellate Court Branch, Office of the General Counsel, NLRB, Washington, D.C.
18 The Board's Statements of Procedure provides only that following enforcement of a
Board decree, the regional office shall be responsible for investigating the respondent's
efforts to comply; "[i]f it finds that the respondent has failed to live up to the terms of
the court's decree, the general counsel may, on behalf of the Board, petition the court to
hold him in contempt of court." 29 CF.R. § 101.15 (1971).
'9 See NLRB Memorandum 67-15, Mar. 16, 1967, a two-page statement of policy from
the General Counsel to "all regional directors, officers-in-charge, and resident officers"
(copy on file at The University of Chicago Law Review) [hereinafter cited as the Memo.
randum]. Reports are sent to the Division of Operations and to the "Contempt Section"
of the Appellate Court Branch.
20 The Memorandum, supra note 19, specifies that "the scope of the issues in the basic
litigation should be broadly construed and the full natural meaning given to the lan.
guage of the decree or order."
21 The Memorandum, supra note 19, offers as illustrations "refusal to reinstate discriminatees involved in the basic case; continued 8(a)(1) or 8(b)(1)(A) even though involving
a unit different from the one in the basic case; recurrence of unilateral clanges in terms
and conditions; refusal to post; refusal to furnish payroll or other records."
22 See text and notes at notes 175-77 infra.
23 See text and notes at notes 183-94 infra. The Memorandum, sura note 19, inicates
that this is the situation "where a reinstatement remedy appears to be affected by a nondiscriminatory change in the respondent's operation, or where new charges of discrimina-
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Any reference in the memorandum to a "Contempt Section" is
somewhat misleading to one unfamiliar with the operation of the Office
of the General Counsel in Washington. The "Contempt Section" consists of only two supervisory attorneys of the Appellate Court Branch
(recently designated "Chief" and "Deputy Chief"), who refer reports
from regional offices to briefing attorneys in the Appellate Court Branch
at random. These "chiefs" appear to be without authority, however,
since briefing attorneys must be persuaded to accept a contempt case.24
Although no written guidelines govern the processing of contempt
cases in Washington, a procedure has become well established. The reviewing attorney usually communicates with the regional attorneys and
charging party and sometimes with the respondent. The difference
between review at the regional and Appellate Court Branch levels is
a matter of emphasis. In the region, investigation and fact finding have
priority; the attorney in Washington, who of necessity must rely upon
the facts as found by the region, concentrates mainly on their legal
ramifications.
When the review is completed by the attorney and his supervisor,
regardless of whether the conclusion coincides with that of the region,
an oral report and recommendation is communicated to the General
Counsel for his approval. If he favors proceeding in contempt, he must
submit a detailed memorandum to the Board for its review. 25 The institution of contempt proceedings has evidently been made dependent
upon formal authorization by the Board because of possible policy
considerations. 2 6 Significantly, decisions of the General Counsel not
tion are filed with respect to employees not involved in the original proceedings or where
complicated issues of successorship liability are presented . . . .. For examples of such
contempt cases, see NLRB v. Heck's, Inc., 388 F.2d 668 (4th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Tempest
Shirt Mfg. Co., 285 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1960); NLRB v. Lightner Publishing Corp., 128 F.2d
237 (7th Cir. 1942); NLRB v. Tupelo Garment Co., 122 F.2d 603 (5th Cir. 1941).
24 There has apparently never been a separately staffed section devoted exclusively to
contempt work. In the early 1940s, contempt cases were assigned to a "Trial Section," whose
attorneys performed a "miscellany of duties." 4 NLR.B ANN. REP. 9 (1940). Over the years,
the processing of contempt cases has been transferred in turn to the Injunction or District
Court Branch, then to the Advice Branch, and finally to the Appellate Court Branch.
25 20 Fed. Reg. 2175 (1955), as amended, 23 Fed. Reg. 6966 (1958), 24 Fed. Reg. 6666
(1959). However, the Board need not so require. Section 3(d) of the Act broadly provides
that the General Counsel "shall have such other duties as the Board may prescribe." 29
U.S.C. § 153(d) (1970). The Act nowhere restricts the Board's power to delegate to the
General Counsel the authority to determine whether or not to institute contempt proceedings. See note 27 infra.
26 In another context, Chief Judge Bazelon has said that "[t]he decision to seek an
adjucation of contempt ... was as much a question of public policy as any enforcement
decision before the Labor Board. Consequently, only the Board was competent to make
it:" NLRB v. Kohler Co., 351 F.2d 798, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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to proceed in contempt are discretionary and need not be referred to
the Board.
If the Board decides to proceed, it directs the General Counsel to
file the contempt petition. 27 The attorney in the Appellate Court
Branch who originally reviewed the case prepares the necessary court
papers, and the case is tried by attorneys from the Branch and regional
offices. The regional office that referred the case is expected to render
any assistance required in preparing the prosecution of the case. 28
II.

COURT PROCEEDINGS

The General Counsel initiates the contempt proceeding by filing
a petition with the appropriate court of appeals moving that the respondent be ordered to show cause why it should not be adjudged in
contempt. Ordinarily the show cause order issues routinely; but in at
least four instances, courts have heard argument on this question. 29
After the show cause order has issued and the respondent has filed an
answer, the court has three alternatives. It may decide the case on the
pleadings, hear the case itself, or appoint a special master to take
evidence.
A. Decision on the Pleadings vs. Hearings by Court or Master
In six early cases,8 0 the Board sought decision on the pleadings alone
and obtained the requested summary disposition in all but one. 81 The
27 The power of the Board to delegate its authority to institute contempt proceedings
to the General Counsel has never been challenged in an enforcement case. In an analogous
proceeding under what is now section 100) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1970), a district
court judge held such delegation valid. Evans v. International Typographical Union, 81
F. Supp. 675 (S.D. Ind. 1948). The Board in a "'Memorandum of Understanding' had

specifically delegated to the General Counsel the power to initiate and prosecute injunctive proceedings under Section 10(j)." Id. at 678. The court had previously sanctioned this
in the same case, 76 F. Supp. 881, 888-89, citing what is now section 3(d) of the Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 153(d) (1970). The General Counsel had instituted contempt proceedings against the
union for violating a decree of the district court temporarily enjoining certain conduct.
The court concluded that in view of the supplementary nature of the power to institute
contempt proceedings, the General Counsel's authority to do so was implied in the express
delegation of the inclusive power to seek injunctive relief.
28 The Appellate Court Branch and regional attorneys assigned to the case also negotiate any settlement agreements. These, of course, are subject to court approval.
29 NLRB v. Piedmont Cotton Mills, 205 F.2d 566 (5th Cir. 1953); NLRB v. Reed &
Prince Mfg. Co., 196 F.2d 755 (1st Cir. 1952); NLRB v. Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock
Corp., 195 F.2d 632 (4th Cir. 1952); NLRB v. Aldora Mills, 197 F.2d 265 (5th Cir. 1952).
In all four cases, the courts refused to issue show cause orders.
30 NLRB v. Weirton Steel Co., 146 F.2d 144 (3d Cir. 1944); Edward G. Budd ,Mfg.Co.'
v. NLRB, 142 F.2d 922 (3d Cir. 1944); Reliance Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 143 F.2d 761 (7th.Cir.
1944); NLRB v. El Paso Elec. Co., 133 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1943); NLRB v. American: Mfg.
Co., 132 F.2d 740 (5th Cir. 1943); NLRB v. Whittier Mills Co., 123 F.2d 725 (5th Cir. 1941).
31 NLRB v. Weirton Steel Co., 146 F,2d 144 (3d Cir. 1944).
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Board lost three of the five cases so decided, 2 and it appears that no
contempt cases have been submitted on the pleadings since. Courts
have occasionally determined, however, that pleadings alone or plead38
ings and affidavits are a sufficient basis for decision.
In most cases, the pleadings present a factual controversy, and a
hearing is ordered by the court. Infrequently, a court will take evidence
itself;3 4 but because of heavy dockets, the usual practice is to appoint
a master to take testimony and to make findings of fact and conclusions
of law. The Board files a "Motion for the Appointment of a Special
Master," alleging that issues of fact require a hearing for resolution and
normally suggesting the appointment of either a federal district court
judge or a hearing examiner from some other federal agency. The
selection of a federal judge or hearing examiner eliminates any problem
of compensating the master. 5
B.

Civil vs. Criminal Cases

The Board usually seeks a civil contempt adjudication. Criminal
contempt cases are brought occasionally, 8 but the courts are reluctant
to adjudicate criminal contempt or to impose criminal sanctions.3 7 The
theory of denominating the suit "civil" is that it is solely remedial in
nature8 and is instituted to obtain the benefits of the underlying decree.
Criminal contempt, in contrast, is punitive in nature, serving to
vindicate the authority of the court. 9 It has been said that contempt
proceedings "are sui generis-neither civil actions nor prosecutions
for offenses, within the ordinary meaning of those terms," 40 and this
32 Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 142 F.2d 922 (3d Cir. 1944); NLRB v. El Paso
Elec. Co., 133 F.2d 168 (5th Cdr. 1943); NLRB v. Whittier Mills Co., 123 F.2d 725 (5th
Cir. 1941).
33 In NLRB v. Hamilton Co., 42 L.R.R.M. 2287 (10th Cir. 1958), and NLRB v. Bank
of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 147 F.2d 287 (9th Cir. 1945), for example, the Board's
petition was denied. In NLRB v. Shannon, 229 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1956), and NLRB v.
Newark Morning Ledger Co., 126 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1942), it was granted.
34 See, e.g., NLRB v. Building Serv. Employees Local 254, 376 F.2d 131 (1st Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 856 (1967); NLRB v. Lambert, 250 F.2d 801 (5th Cir. 1958).
85 The court could, if it chose to do so, assess the costs of the salary of a federal judge
or hearing examiner against the contemnor.
8 See, e.g., In re Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 886 F.2d 309 (5th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Star
Metal Mfg. Co., 187 F.2d 856 (3d Cir. 1951). When the court decides that a proceeding in
criminal contempt is justified, it normally appoints outside counsel to prosecute, and the
trial is held in a court of appeals courtroom.
37 See, e.g., NLRB v. Hod Carriers Local 210, 228 F.2d 589 (2d Cir. 1955); NLRB v.
Israel Putnam Mills, 197 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1952); NLRB v. Berkley Mach. Works & Foundry
Co., 189 F.2d 904 (4th Cir. 1951); NLRB v. Rico, 182 F.2d 254 (9th Cir. 1950).
38 NLRB v. Hopwood Retinning Co., 104 F.2d 302, 305 (2d Cir. 1939).
39 Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911).
40 Myers v. United States, 264 U.S. 95, 103 (1924). "Contempts are neither wholly civil
nor altogether criminal." Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911).

1972]

Taft-Hartley Contemnors

seems particularly true of contempt proceedings brought by the Board.41
The primary purpose is to enforce the national labor policy; preserving
the benefits of the decree for the charging party is secondary, as is
vindicating the authority of the court.42 Regardless of whether this
traditional classification can withstand analysis, it is the present framework and is significant in determining the elements of the contempt,
the standard of proof, and the sanctions to be invoked.48 In a criminal
contempt suit, the Board must prove that the violation was "knowing,
willful and intentional."" No such showing of state of mind is theoretically necessary in civil contempt; courts frequently, however, look
to the element of good faith in deciding whether to adjudge a respondent in contempt.45 Although the Board as the petitioner always has
the burden of proving that the decree has been violated, the standards
of proof between civil and criminal contempt differ. In civil contempt,
this burden is satisfied by "clear and convincing" evidence; a criminal
contempt adjudication must be based on proof "beyond a reasonable
46
doubt."
C.

Remedies

If the respondent is cited for contempt, the court must determine the
nature and extent of the decree that it will issue to effectuate its judgment. While the Board is normally requested to submit a decree for
consideration, 47 the court is free to accept, reject, or modify the Board's
recommendations 48 or to refer the case back to the special master for
a determination of appropriate sanctions. 9
Criminal contempt sanctions are punitive. In United States v. United
41 See text and notes at notes 167-74 infra.

42 As the Supreme Court stated in Amalgamated Util. Workers v. Consolidated Edison
Co., 809 U.S. 261, 269 (1940): "It is the Board's order on behalf of the public that the
court enforces. It is the Board's right to make that order that the court sustains."

Concerning sanctions, see text and notes at notes 51-69 infra.
See text and note at note 175 infra.
45 In re Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc,, 386 F.2d 809, 313 (5th Cir. 1967). Intent is irrelevant
in civil contempt once it has been determined that the decree has been violated. See text
and notes at notes 142-49 infra.
45 See text and notes at notes 175-77 infra.
47 See, e.g., NLRB v. Satilla Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 393 F.2d 184, 1386 (5th Cir.
1968).
48 McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 386 U.S. 187, 191-93 (1949);.-TMited States v.
United Mine Workers, 880 U.S. 258, 303-04 (1947); NLRB v. Vander Wal, 316 F.2d 681,
684 (9th Cir. 1963); NLRB v. Nesen, 211 F.2d 559, 564 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 848
U.S. 820 (1957). In NLRB v. Star Metal Mfg. Co., 187 F.2d 856, 857 (3d Cir. 1951),'the
Board's request for permanent mandatory injunction was denied on the ground that it
would create a "procedural quagmire."
49 See, e.g., NLRB v. Teamsters Local 282, 438 F.2d 100 (2d Cir. 1970).
43
44
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Mine Workers,50 the Supreme Court enunciated the general guidelines
to be followed in determining the appropriate penalty:
In imposing a fine for criminal contempt, the trial judge may
properly take into consideration the extent of the willful and
deliberate defiance of the court's order, the seriousness of the
consequences of the contumacious behavior, the necessity of
effectively terminating the defendant's defiance as required by the
public interest, and the importance of deterring such acts in the
future.5 1
Notwithstanding this language, the courts have in practice typically
imposed fines for criminal contempt with little or no discussion of the
52
relationship between the offense and the penalty.
The sanctions for civil contempt are remedial and are aimed at
securing compliance with the court's decree, deterring future contumacious conduct, and compensating the complainant for losses that have
resulted from the respondent's actions.53 While courts have on occasion
imposed a flat fine on a civil contemnor, 4 the usual decree is multifaceted, structured to be responsive to the violation. This decree typically contains the requirement that the contemnor purge himself by
doing what he failed to do under the original decree. A respondent that,
for example, engages in surface bargaining in violation of a court-enforced bargaining order will be commanded to negotiate in good faith;55
a union that persists in engaging in secondary boycotts in violation of
a court order will be required to cease this activity.56 In addition, the
contemnor is required to file a sworn statement with the court or
the Board's Regional Director specifying the steps being taken to comply
with the order and to post notices informing employees or members of
57
the contempt adjudication.
50 330 U.S. 258 (1946).
51 Id. at 303.
52 In In re Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 386 F.2d 309 (5th Cir. 1967), ten thousand dollar and
five hundred dollar fines were imposed on company and its president, respectively,
for violating a section 8(a)(3) order, with no discussion as to appropriateness. In NLRB v.
Essex County News Co., 28 L.R.R.M. 2634 (3d Cir. 1951), a union and its president were
fined ten thousand dollars and two thousand dollars, respectively, for failure to post
notice, with discussion.
53 See, e.g., NLRB v. Nickey Chevrolet Sales, Inc., 76 L.R.R.M. 2849 (7th Cir. 1971);
NLRB v. Crown Laundry & Dry Cleaners, 437 F.2d 290 (5th Cir. 1971); NLR.B v. Operating
Eng'rs Local 825, 430 F.2d 1225 (3d Cir. 1970). See also note 48 supra.
54 See NLR.B v. F.M. Reeves & Sons, 273 F.2d 710 (10th Cir. 1961); NLRB v. Giannasca,
119 F.2d 756 (2d Cir. 1941).
55 Carpinteria Lemon Ass'n v. NLRB, 274 F.2d 492 (9th Cir. 1960).
56 NLRB v. Teamsters Local 676, 450 F.,d 413 (3d Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Operating
Eng'rs Local 825, 430 F.2d 1225 (3d Cir. 1970).
57 See, e.g., NLRB v. Ralph Printing & Lithographing Co., 433 F.2d 1058 (8th Cir.
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To insure compliance with its order, the court, in addition to requiring strict adherence to the terms of the original decree, often imposes a fine conditioned upon the contemnor's failure to purge himself
by a specified date, consisting of a lump sum, an amount to be imposed
for each day of any further violation, or both. 58 It is typical of a civil
contempt adjudication that sanctions are prospective, except when they
are designed to dissipate harm caused others by the contumacious
conduct.5 9
While imposition of a fine is dearly discretionary, the fine conditioned
upon future noncompliance is often levied when it is anticipated that
future or continuing violation is likely, as in refusal-to-bargain cases,60
or when the recalcitrance of the contemnor appears egregious.6 1 The
amount of the noncompliance fine is determined upon a consideration
of "the character and magnitude of the harm threatened by continued
contumacy, ... the probable effectiveness of any suggested sanction in
bringing about the result desired... [and] the amount of defendant's
1970); NLRB v. Hod Carriers Local 210, 228 F.2d 589 (2d Cir. 1955). Although the requirement is usually satisfied by posting the notices provided by the Board in "conspicuous" places throughout the plant or the union hall, whichever the case may be, courts
occasionally demand more. In NLRB v. Crown Laundry & Dry Cleaners, 437 F.2d 290
(5th Cir. 1971), an employer who had interfered with a representation election was
ordered not only to post a notice and a copy of the court's order for sixty days, but also
to mail the notice to each employee and to post the notice a second time for a period of
ten days before any new election. The court rejected the argument that this requirement
was unduly burdensome. See also NLRB v. Service Roofing Co., 77 L.R.R.M. 2962 (9th
Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Operating Eng'rs Local 825, 430 F.2d 1225 (3d Cir. 1970).
58 See, e.g., NLRB v. Nickey Chevrolet Sales, Inc., 76 L.R.R.M. 2849 (7th Cir. 1971); NLRB
v. Ralph Printing & Lithographing Co., 433 F.2d 1058 (8th Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Operating
Eng'rs Local 825, 430 F.2d 1225 (3d Cir. 1970). But a fine is not always levied. See, e.g.,
NLRB v. Crown Laundry & Dry Cleaners, 437 F.2d 290 (5th Cir. 1971).
59 NLRB v. Indianapolis Transit Mix Corp., 77 L.R.R.M. 2979 (7th Cir. 1971). In NLRB
v. Hod Carriers Local 210, 228 F.2d 589 (2d Cir. 1955), a union that had violated a court
decree by causing an employer to discriminate against nonunion employees was directed
to reimburse the employer for the amount of money it paid to the discriminatees to make
them whole for losses they had sustained as a result of either discriminatory discharge
or checkoff of union initiation fees. In NLRB v. Stafford Trucking Co., 77 L.R.R.M.
2465 (7th Cir. 1971), and NLRB v. Ralph Printing & Lithographing Co., 433 F.2d 1058
(8th Cir. 1970), companies that had violated court orders to bargain by refusing to sign
negotiated collective bargaining agreements were required to reimburse their employees
for all losses of wages and benefits resulting from their recalcitrance. And in NLRB v.
Nickey Chevrolet Sales, Inc., 76 L.R.R.M. 2849 (7th Cir. 1971), an employer that had discriminatorily discharged an employee in violation of a court decree was ordered to make
:
-Z
the employee whole for all pay and benefits lost as a result.
60 See, e.g., NLRB v. Ralph Printing Sc Lithographing Co., 433 F.2d 1058 (8th Cir.
1970); NLRB v. Lynair, 380 F.2d 286 (6th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Vander Wal, 316 F.2d 631
(9th Cir. 1963). But see Carpinteria Lemon Ass'n v. NLRB, 274 F.2d 492 (9th Cir. 1960).
61 See, e.g., NLRB v. Operating Eng'rs Local 825, 430 F.2d 1225 (3d Cir. 1970); NLRB
v. School-Timer Frocks, 248 F.2d 831 (4th Cir. 1957).
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financial resources and the consequent seriousness of the burden to that
particular defendant." 62 The court may also provide that the Board
as the successful petitioner be awarded the costs and expenses of the
investigation, preparation, and trial of the case, including salaries. 3
Costs are awarded primarily as a compensatory fine,6 4 but the deterrent
aspect is not absent.
The court is, of course, not limited to financial sanctions. The most
severe sanction in the court's arsenal is the writ of body attachment,
providing for the arrest and detention of the contemnor for failure to
comply with the court order.65
III. PROCEDURAL RIGHTS OF THE CHARGING
PARTY AND THE RESPONDENT

A.

Rights of the Charging Party Before the Board

A party protected by a court decree that believes the decree has been
or is being violated must submit a complaint to the regional office having
jurisdiction over the respondent and whose responsibility it is to police
the decree;6 6 the agency process then begins. 7 No rules establish any
right of the charging party to be heard in connection with the formula62 United States v. United Mine Workers, 380 U.S. 258, 804 (1947).
63 This award is usually made. In NLRB v. Stafford Trucking Co., 79 L.R.R.M. 3083,
3084 (7th Cir. 1972), the respondent was ordered to reimburse the Board for expenditures,
so long as compliance is not achieved." See also NLRB v.
including "future costs ...
Nickey Chevrolet Sales, Inc., 76 L.R.R.M. 2849 (7th Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Operating Eng'rs
Local 825, 430 F.2d 1225 (3d Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Building Serv. Employees Local 254,
376 F.2d 131, 136 (Ist Cir. 1967). Awards, however, are not always and not uniformly
made. In NLRB v. Crown Laundry & Dry Cleaners, 437 F.2d 290, 295 (5th Cir. 1971), the
court recognized that "contemnors are commonly required to pay the salary and expenses
of the Special Master and the expenses incurred by the Board in the investigation, preparation, and presentation of contempt proceedings." But without explanation, it required
the contennor to pay only one-half of the salaries of Board counsel and employees. In
NLRB v. Stafford Trucking Co., 371 F.2d 244 (7th Cir. 1966), the court without explanation
excluded attorney's fees entirely. And in NLRB v. Ralph Printing & Lithographing Co.,
379 F.2d 687 (8th Cir. 1967), the court excluded both attorney's fees and expenses of investigation, again without explanation,
64 United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 303-04 (1947); Gompers v.
Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 447 (1911); NLRB v. Operating Eng'rs Local 825,
430 F.2d 1225, 1229 (3d Cir. 1970).
65 See, e.g., NLRB v. Ralph Printing & Lithographing Co., 433 F.2d 1058 (8th Cir. 1970);
NLRB v. Interurban Gas Corp., 401 F.2d 743 (6th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Interurban Gas
Corp., 401 F.2d 744 (6th Cir. 1968) (writ issued); NLRB v. Savoy Laundry, 354 F.2d 78 (2d
Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Republican Publishing Co., 180 F.2d 437 (1st Cir. 1950); NLRB v.
Lightner Publishing Co., 128 F.2d 237 (7th Cir. 1942). Two recent cases threatening writ
of body attachment are NLRB v. Indianapolis Transit Mix Corp., 77 L.R.R.M. 2979 (7th
Cir. 1971), and NLRB v. Service Roofing Co., 77 L..R.M. 2962 (9th Cir. 1971).
66 See text and notes at note 19 supra.
67 See text and notes at notes 18-28 supra.
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tion of the region's recommendation.6 8 The rationalization of some
courts is that since the Board is acting in a prosecutorial rather than
an adjudicative role, the elements of due process are not applicable. 69
But sound policy dictates, and the General Counsel evidently agrees,
that the charging party should be given some opportunity to present
its case directly to the Office of the General Counsel, especially since its
participation in the contempt proceeding is otherwise extremely limited.
As a matter of general practice, the charging party and the respondent
are both accorded the privilege of full communication with the Contempt Section of the General Counsel's Office and, in some instances, of
a conference with the General Counsel and/or the Associate General
Counsel in charge of the Division of Litigation." Because every violation of a decree is either an unfair labor practice or a refusal to remedy
the effects thereof, the charging party should have the same opportunity
to confer with the General Counsel's Office as in an unfair labor practice
proceeding. 71
B.

Rights of the Charging Party in Court
More uncertainty attends the rights of the charging party once the
General Counsel and the Board have passed upon the complaint that
a decree has been violated. If the General Counsel or the Board determines not to file in contempt, is the charging party without recourse?72
What are the rights of the charging party, if any, to be heard on a proposed settlement of the complaint? If a contempt petition is filed, may
the charging party intervene?
1. Initiation of Contempt Proceedings. Early in the history of the
National Labor Relations Act, the Supreme Court ruled in Amalgamated Utility Workers v. ConsolidatedEdison Co.73 that the Board had
68

Cf. NLRB Statements of Procedure-Series 8, 29 C.F.R. § 101.6 (1971), providing for

appeals to the General Counsel from the dismissal of an unfair labor practice charge by a
regional director. Such appeals are "fully reviewed by the general counsel with the assistance of his staff."
69 See, e.g., NLRB v. Bird Machine Co., 174 F.2d 404, 407 (1st Cir. 1949); Wallace Corp.
v. NLRB, 159 F.2d 952, 954 (4th Cir. 1947).

70 In an attempt to secure voluntary compliance, the regional office will be in contact
with the respondent, thus allowing the respondent the opportunity to counter, at an
early stage in the contempt process, the charge that it is in violation of the decree.
Normally, the regional office continues to seek compliance throughout the entire proceeding.

71 See note 68 supra.
72 The charging party may be able to obtain a clarification of the court's decree. See
United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 389 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir. 1967), discussed in text and notes at

notes 194-95 infra.
73 309 U.S. 261 (1940).
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exclusive standing to institute contempt proceedings for failure to
comply with a court-enforced Board order. It held that the Board, as
"a public agency acting in the public interest," 74 is "not to give effect
to a 'private administrative remedy.' 75 In the Court's view, Congress
had established the Board as the "exclusive agency" 76 for the prevention
of unfair labor practices and therefore for the institution of contempt
7
proceedings. 7
In 1965, however, the Supreme Court held in Local 283, UAW v.
Scofield78 that either a charging party or a respondent that has been successful before the Board is entitled as a matter of right to intervene in
an enforcement or review proceeding if the unsuccessful party challenges the Board's decision. In reaching this conclusion, the Court declared that Amalgamated did not imply that the Board's role of vindicating public rights in effectuating the national labor policy "excludes
recognition of parochial private interests." 79 The Court observed, for
example, that a charging party may have "vital private rights"80 in any
proceeding that not only concerns an alleged unfair labor practice but
also potentially involves a breach of the applicable collective bargaining
agreement. In such a case, a ruling by a court of appeals in a Board enforcement proceeding could have a definite impact upon a subsequent
decision by an arbitrator or by another court in a breach-of-contract case
under section 801 of the Taft-Hartley Act. The private rights of the
charging party can thus be protected only if intervention is permitted in
the enforcement proceeding, enabling the court to be apprised of all
relevant private rights when it defines the public interest in fashioning
Id. at 265.
75 Id. at 269.
74

76 Id. at 264; see National Labor Relations Act § 10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1970).
77 In Keco Indus. v. NLRB, 46 L.R.R.M. 2003 (6th Cir. 1960), the court denied the
motion of an employer for an order requiring the taking of testimony under oath to
determine whether the employer had complied with a previous court-enforced Board
order. Citing Amalgamated Util. Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309 U.S. 261 (1940),
the court stated that "[o]rderly, long-established procedure places exclusively in the Labor
Board the initiative for compliance with the enforcement of such orders." 46 L.R.R.M.
at 2004. It is questionable whether the court accurately assessed the issue in this case if
only a request for perpetuation of testimony was involved. FEa. R. Crv. P. 27 provides
for perpetuation of testimony in a district court "regarding any matter that may be
cognizable in any court of the United States." (Emphasis added.) One precondition to
such testimony is "that the petitioner expects to be a party to an action cognizable in a
court of the United States but is presently unable to bring it or cause it to be brought."
78 382 U.S. 205 (1965). Scofield involved the right of a successful respondent to intervene in a review proceeding. Local 133, UAW v. Fafnir Bearing Co., consolidated with
Scofield, involved the right of a successful charging party to intervene in an enforcement
proceeding.
79 Id. at 218.
80 Id. at 220.
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its decree. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court in Scofield reaffirmed its
holding in Amalgamated on the theory that contempt proceedings involve the Board's expertise in achieving compliance rather than a ruling
on the merits of a Board order.
The question is open whether a charging party can mandamus the
Board to initiate contempt proceedings. Only one case, Vapor Blast
Independent Shop Workers Association v. Simon,8 ' has discussed the
question. 2 The court held that since it is within the Board's discretion
to enter into a compromise settlement with a respondent in lieu of bringing a contempt proceeding, a writ of mandamus would not issue. The
logic appears correct; since the institution of a contempt proceeding is
discretionary, 3 it cannot be compelled. The court stressed that the
Board had not abused its discretion, but explicitly reserved judgment
on whether mandamus would be proper if the Board's action had been
arbitrary or capricious.8 4 On analogy to the General Counsel's apparently unreviewable discretion in issuing unfair labor practice complaints,8 5 it might seem that even in such an instance mandamus does
not lie, and one court has reached a conclusion arguably supporting
this view.86
81 305 F.2d 717 (7th Cir. 1962).
82 Without discussion, the court in NLRB v. Western Wirebound Box Co., 70 L.R.R.M.
2226 (9th Cir. 1968), denied a motion to intervene for the purpose of compelling the
Board to show cause why there had not been compliance with the decree and why the
Board had not sought to compel the respondent to comply.
83 See Amalgamated Util. Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309 U.S. 261 (1940) (by
implication); NLRB v. Shurtenda Steaks, Inc., 424 F.2d 192 (10th Cir. 1970); NLRB v.
Kohler Co., 351 F.2d 798 (D.C. Cir. 1965). In Thompson Prods., Inc. v. NLRB, 133
F.2d 637 (6th Cir. 1943), the company petitioned the court to compel the Board to cease
an unfair labor practice hearing and to bring a contempt proceeding in its place. The
court denied the petition, holding that the Board has its choice of proceedings.
84 305 F.2d 717, 719 n.2.
85 Mayer v. Ordman, 391 F.2d 889, 892 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 925 (1968): "It is
clear.., that refusal by the NLRB to issue a complaint is an exercise of discretion unreviewable by the courts." Vaca v. Sipes, 886 U.S. 171, 182 (1967) (dictum): "[IMhe Board's
General Counsel has unreviewable discretion to refuse to institute an unfair labor practice
complaint." See also Association of Ry. Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 303-04 (1971)
(Douglas, J., dissenting). A few courts had indicated, by way of dictum, that the General
Counsel's refusal to issue a complaint might be judicially reviewable if found to be
arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or a violation of constitutional rights.
See, e.g., Balanyl v. Local 1031, IBEW, 374 F.2d 723, 726 (7th Cir. 1967); Retail Store
Employees v. Rotbman, 298 F.2d 330, 332 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
86 In Stewart Die Casting Corp. v. NLRB, 132 F.2d 801 (7th Cir. '1942), the Board,
after petitioning for a contempt adjudication, compromised with the respondent its dispute
as to how much money was owed to discriminatees, and the contempt order' was discharged.
The employees sought to intervene on the ground that the compromise deprived'them of
amounts up to fourteen percent of their correct back-wage claims. While the court, citing
Amalgamated Util. Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309 U.S. 261 (1940), denied
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One exception to Board discretion might be made where the charging
party has previously intervened in the enforcement proceedings."7 The
complainant is then a party bound by the decree that is allegedly being
violated and for which contempt proceedings would be sought; were
it not for the limitation imposed by the national labor policy, the charging party could initiate contempt proceedings. The Supreme Court's
emphasis in Scofield that "public" and "private" interests do not
diverge but rather "interblend '8 8 lends support to the position that
under these circumstances, mandamus should lie. The question,
therefore, becomes one of accommodating private interests within the
framework of Board discretion. On the one hand, the Board's discretion
to act according to its views of the public interest ought not to be
unduly inhibited. Due consideration must also be given to the Board's
work load, its need to husband its resources, and the danger of dogging
the courts with increased litigation. But this will mean that in some
cases no proceedings against an alleged contemnor will be instituted,
in others an unfair labor practice hearing will be held,8 9 and in still
others the rights of the complaining party may be compromised. 90
A charging party's petition to mandamus the Board to file for contempt is, of course, a challenge to the Board's expertise in achieving
compliance with the enforcement decree. Although broad discretion
may be desirable in most cases, if the Board refuses to act or enters into
a compromise agreement in arbitrary and capricious disregard of the
statutory policies, thereby abusing its discretion, a court ought not to
ignore private rights completely by denying the benefits of its decree
to a party that is bound by and protected under the decree.
2. Settlement Agreements. Although it has never been decided
whether a charging party has a right to a hearing on a proposed contempt
intervention, it reached this conclusion with reluctance, deferring to "the large and
autocratic powers of the Board" and the requirement that courts "accept the Act as it is."
132 F.2d at 804.
Admittedly, the refusal to initiate contempt proceedings is not a "final order" and hence
is not reviewable on that ground. See Lincourt v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 306, 307 (Ist Cir. 1948):
"[T]he phrase 'a final order of the Board' as used in this subsection 'refers solely to an
order of the Board either dismissing a complaint in whole or in part or directing a remedy
for the unfair labor practices found, that is to an order entered as the culmination of
the procedure described in Section 10(b) and (c) of the Act, as amended."' Cf. Medical
Committee for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 668 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
87 It is now well settled that a successful charging party or a successful respondent has
the right to intervene in court of appeals proceedings to enforce or review a Board order.
Local 283, UAW v. Scofield, 382 U.S. 205 (1965).
88 Id. at 220.
89 See Thompson Prods., Inc. v. NLRB, 133 F.2d 637 (6th Cir. 1943).
90 See Stewart Die Casting Corp. v. NLRB, 132 F.2d 801 (7th Cir. 1942).
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settlement, an argument in favor of such a right may be framed on two
grounds. First, the court's emphasis in Vapor Blast that the compromise
settlement was not arbitrary or capricious implies that some form of
hearing might be allowed in certain instances to prevent an abuse
of discretion.
Second, cases outside the context of contempt proceedings have held
that a charging party has a right to a hearing on objections to a proposed
settlement of a Board complaint prior to the conduct of a hearing
before a trial examiner, either as a matter of right91 or at least when it
can show that there are "any material issues of disputed fact" presented
by the objections.9 2 In Marine Engineers Benevolent Association v.
NLRB,93 the Third Circuit ruled that a charging party is entitled to
an evidentiary hearing on objections to a proposed settlement of an
unfair labor practice proceeding on the theory that it is an "interested"
party within the meaning of section 5(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act. In a more recent case, Concrete Materials v. NLRB,9 4 the
Fifth Circuit sustained the charging party's right to a hearing if the
objections to the settlement raise "material issues of disputed fact."9 5
The court concluded that although technically the dispute is between
the Regional Director and the respondent, the charging party's presence
may be crucial if it has a sufficient interest and that it should have the
opportunity, through participation in some fashion in the settlement
negotiations, to have its interests considered prior to any final determination of the dispute.
3. Intervention.When the Board does proceed in contempt, the question is presented whether the charging party may intervene. This right
has almost never been granted."' Intervention in a contempt proceeding
was denied in Stewart Die Casting Corp. v. NLRB0 on the ground that
"the Board is the duly specified and exclusively named agency to speak
for and protect the employees in these proceedings ... [and the] sole
91 Marine Eng'rs Benevolent Ass'n No. 13 v. NLRB, 202 F.2d 546 (3d Cir. 1953).
92 Concrete Materials v. NLR.B, 440 F.2d 61, 68 (5th Cir. 1971). Contra, Sears, Roebuck
& Co. v. Solien, 450 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1971); Teamsters Local 282 v. NLRB, 339 F.2d 795

(2d Cir. 1964).
93 202 F.2d 546 (3d Cir. 1953).
94 440 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1971).
95 Id. at 68.
96 The charging party was denied intervention in contempt proceedings in NLRB v.
Shurtenda Steaks, Inc., 424 F.2d 192 (10th Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Kohier Co., 351 F.2d 798
(D.C. Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 243 F.2d 777 (9th Cir. 1956); and
Stewart Die Casting Corp. v. NLR.B, 132 F.2d 801 (7th Cir. 1942). Only one case has been
found in which intervention has been permitted, and in that case the court did not discuss
the issue. NLRB v. Star Metal Mfg. Co., 187 F.2d 856 (3d Cir. 1951).
97 132 F.2d 801 (7th Cir. 1942).
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guardian, of the rights of the employee."' 8 And in NLRB v. Kohler
Co.,99 the court denied intervention on the ground that party status was,
according to the union, inconsistent with Amalgamated Utility Workers,10 0 which had held that the Board had exclusive power to initiate
contempt proceedings. 101 Reading that case to mean that the decision
to proceed in contempt "was as much a question of public policy as any
enforcement decision before the Labor Board . . . [and that c]onsequently, only the Board was competent to make it," the court thought
that this reasoning applied to the motion to intervene, albeit "[w]ith less
force."1 o2
The Supreme Court cast serious doubt on the rationale of these cases
by its holding in Scofield that either a charging party or a respondent
that has been successful before the Board has a right to intervene in an
enforcement or review proceeding if the unsuccessful party challenges
the Board's decision. The Court affirmed the existence within the statutory scheme of private rights that are not completely subsumed under
the public interest represented by the Board and which may be deserving of independent representation.103 Discussing Amalgamated, the
Court drew a clear line between initiation of a proceeding and intervention:
We find nothing inconsistent in denying the right of a private
party to institute a contempt proceeding-where the Board's expertness in achieving compliance with orders is challenged-and,
on the other hand, in permitting intervention in a proceeding
already in the court for decision. When the court is to rule on the
merits of the Board's order, the Act supports the view that it is
the court and not the agency which will define the public interest
104

Moreover, the Court stressed that it would be ascribing capriciousness
to Congress to conclude that a successful party in a Board proceeding
should not have the same opportunity as an unsuccessful one to perId. at 803.
99 351 F.2d 798 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
100 309 U.S. 261 (1940).
101 See text and notes at notes 73-77 supra.
102 351 F.2d at 809.
103 A similar approach was taken in Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 92 S. Ct. 630
(1972), in which the Supreme Court upheld intervention under FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2)
to set aside an election of union officers. The Court recognized that the Board may not
adequately represent the interests of a private party, if for no other reason than that they
may not always have "precisely the same approach to the conduct of the litigation." Id.
at 636. Note that in proceedings before the Board, the charging party has been accorded
party status, which is shared with the General Counsel. NLRB Rules and RegulationsSeries 8, 29 C.F.R. § 102.8 (1971).
104 282 U.S. at 221.
98
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suade the court in Taft-Hartley appellate proceedings. The charging
party should "not be prejudiced by his success before the agency."105
NLRB v. Shurtenda Steaks, Inc.0 6 is the only case decided after
Scofield in which a court has discussed the question of intervention. The
Tenth Circuit held that a charging party that had been successful before
the Board but had not intervened in the enforcement proceeding could
not intervene in the contempt proceeding "absent extraordinary and
unusual circumstances."' 107 Approaching the issue cautiously, the court
was of the opinion that the only reason advanced in Scofield for permitting intervention that applied in Shurtenda was prevention of unnecessary duplication of proceedings. 0 8 In Shurtenda, the union had
filed subsequent unfair labor practice charges against the company
based on the identical acts upon which the Board was relying in its
contempt petition. Were the Board to issue a complaint and litigate
the same violations in an administrative proceeding, the possibility
would exist for an appeal following a Board decision involving precisely
the same issues to be decided in the contempt proceeding. This threat
of multiple appeals was obviated when the Board advised the court
that it would not "relitigate the same violations in an administrative
proceeding should this court decide the issues against it."' 109
The difficulty with the court's analysis is that the avoidance of
multiple proceedings was only one of several factors upon which the
Supreme Court relied in Scofield and that it was emphasized by the
Court in its discussion of the right to intervention of a successful
respondentin a review proceeding. In holding that a successful charging
party may intervene in enforcement proceedings, the Court stressed the
necessity and fairness of according protection to the private interests of
such a party.
As noted above, the court in Shurtenda implied without explication
that in "extraordinary and unusual circumstances," intervention would
be permitted. There is also the suggestion that if the Board had acted
arbitrarily or was not adequately representing the private interests of
the charging party, or if the charging party could have been "of help"
in the contempt proceeding, intervention might have been allowed."10
105 Id. at 222. But see NLRB v. Decaturville Sportswear Co., 80 L.R.R.M. 2387 (6th Cir.
1972) (denying a master intervention as of right, rejecting arguments based primarily on
Scofield and Trbovich).
106 424 F.2d 192 (10th Cir. 1970).
107 Id. at 194.
108 Local 283, UAW v. Scofield, 382 U.S. 205, 212 (1965). Cf. 3B J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTica
24.06[3.8] (2d ed. 1963): "Where the prevention of multiple appeals is not at stake,
the rule [of Scofield] should not apply."
109 424 F.2d at 194.
11o Id. The union stated to the court that it did "'not seek to change or redirect the
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In this connection, it should be noted that although the court in Kohler
denied the intervention motion of the charging party-union, it did
"suggest to the Master that it would be appropriate for him to permit
the Union to participate" in supplemental proceedings to determine
"factual questions: which employees fall into what categories for which
relief may be ordered."" 1 The court reasoned that the very narrow
factual issue of which individual workers were entitled to reinstatement
and back pay and the date of their entitlement did not involve "questions of policy and law on which Board-Union conflict might arise ....
[T]he Union could make a substantial contribution to this inquiry
...

[and] Union participation will [not] markedly delay or hinder the

proceedings." 1 2
The Shurtenda court also implied that intervention might have been
permitted, absent "extraordinary and unusual circumstances," if the
union had intervened in the enforcement proceeding and that its failure
in this respect rendered its motion to intervene in the contempt proceeding "untimely."" 2 If the charging party has intervened at the
enforcement stage, a stronger argument can be made that intervention
in the contempt proceeding should be allowed on the ground that the
latter proceeding is merely ancillary to the former. It is submitted, however, that the right to intervene at the contempt stage should not
turn on intervention in the enforcement proceeding.
It might be argued that fairness to the respondent and efficiency of
procedure dictate that the charging party not participate in a proceeding
involving the interpretation of a decree that has been shaped solely
by the Board's concept of the public interest, as balanced against the
rights of the respondent and the charging party. But it does not follow,
from the fact that the charging party has the right to participate in all
proceedings leading to the entry of the enforcement decree, that the
Board's efforts' and that it ... [sought] 'only to be allowed to participate and present
evidence in support of the Board's position.' No claim .. . was] made that the Board
... [had] acted arbitrarily or that it... twould] not adequately represent the interest of
the Union." Id. at 193.
11 351 F.2d at 809 (emphasis added).
112 Id. In Flambeau Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 79 L.R.R.M. 2329 (7th Cir. 1972), an
intervention motion of the charging party-union was denied by the master, without
prejudice, of course, to its right to renew the motion before the court. The master concluded that under the order of reference, he had no authority to grant intervention, and
that, in any event, unlike Kohler, in which the union had been permitted "to participate"
in the supplemental proceedings on the narrowest of factual issues, "[in the instant case
the... Court of Appeals ... has not by decision removed all possibility of disagreement
between the Board and the Union ... " Id. at 2330.
113 424 F.2d at 194. "Under Scofield, the Union could have intervened in the enforcement
proceedings, but failed to do so. Instead it waited until the Board began contempt proceedings.... The Board obtained the judgment without the help of the Union." Id.
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right to intervene at the contempt stage should be conditioned upon
the exercise of the right at earlier stages. Efficiency of procedure in
fact militates against any such rule; the charging party should be
encouraged to participate only in those proceedings in which, in the
opinion of the charging party, its private interests will not be adequately
represented by the Board. Moreover, even if the charging party has
not intervened at the enforcement stage, participation in the contempt
proceeding can in no way be prejudicial to the respondent since the
charging party in the contempt proceeding cannot affect the existing decree, which is the creation of the prior interaction among the Board,
the respondent, and the court. To the extent that the contempt decree
might amplify or otherwise modify the enforcement decree, the charging
party should surely be as free to intervene at the contempt stage as it
is at the enforcement stage.
C.

Rights of the Respondent in Discovery

There has been little controversy in the courts concerning the procedural rights of a respondent, except with respect to discovery against
the Board."14 It is now settled that in a contempt proceeding, the court
has the power to compel this form of discovery and to delegate its
power to the master charged with hearing the case."x5 Board rules restricting discovery in unfair labor practice hearings1 8 do not limit the
court's power,"17 and the proceedings are governed by the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure."18
The Second Circuit, quite properly applying the Jencks rule"19 to
Taft-Hartley contempt proceedings, has required the production of
pretrial statements made by witnesses who testify at trial, but only after
114 Other procedural rights have been litigated. Alleged contemnors do not have a
right to a jury trial, whether the charge is civil contempt, NLRB v. Red Arrow Freight

Lines, Inc., 193 F.2d 979 (5th Cir. 1952), or criminal contempt, see United States v. Barnett,
376 U.S. 681 (1964). In Keco Indus. v. NLRB, 46 L.R.R.M. 2003 (6th Cir. 1960),
discussed in note 77 supra, the petitioner's request for perpetuation of testimony was
denied.
115 Olson Rug Co. v. NLRB, 291 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1961), and cases cited therein at
659. See also Sperandeo v. Milk Drivers Local 537, 334 F.2d 381 (10th Cir. 1964); Harvey
Aluminum, Inc. v. NLRB, 335 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1964).
116 See NLRB Rules and Regulations-Series 8, 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.117-18 (1971). The
incorporation of a Jencks rule in section 102.118 resulted from NLRB v. Adhesive
Prods. Corp., 258 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1958). See also Ra-Rich Mfg. Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 700
(1958).
117 Olson Rug Co. v. NLRB, 291 F.2d 655, 661 (7th Cir. 1961).
'Is FED. R. Crv. P. 26-37. See, eg., NLRB v. Schill Steel Prods., Inc., 408 F.2d 803 (5th
Cir. 1969).
119 Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957); see 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970).
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the testimony has been taken. 120 This postponement is generally justified
on the ground that it encourages full disclosure to Board investigators
and prevents coercion of witnesses that might lead to a refusal to testify
or modification of testimony. 12 ' The Fifth Circuit, extending the
doctrine to require pretrial production in NLRB v. Schill Steel Products, Inc., 22 was of the opinion that the danger of coercion or reprisal
would not increase if statements of Board witnesses were released at the
discovery stage rather than during the course of the contempt hearing.
The court had, however, previously approved the Board's rule that in
unfair labor practice hearings before Board trial examiners, there is a
requirement to produce the pretrial statements of witnesses only after
they have testified at the hearing. 2 3 There is simply no logic or policy
justification for the court's not following at the contempt stage the
procedure it had approved for Board proceedings.
IV.

CRITIQUE OF BOARD ATrTUDES, PRAcncEs, AND PROCEDURES

The modest resort to contempt proceedings by the Board has been
already documented. 24 The 1967 memorandum of the General Counsel 125 speaks of encouraging "a more liberal use of the contempt process"

by reorganizing procedures 126 and adopting "a somewhat more 'contempt-minded' attitude toward repeat violators."' 127 Evidently the Office
of the General Counsel recognized that inadequate attention had been
paid to utilizing the contempt process. Despite these changes, it appears
that the internal organization of the Board still hinders the efficient use
of contempt, and to the extent that this is true, the Board is not fulfilling
its statutory obligation to enforce the national labor policy.
The essence of the problem appears to be a failure to overcome
bureaucratic obstacles in the Washington central office. It appears that
the filing of twenty to twenty-five contempt petitions per year constitutes
120 NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 282, 70 L.R.R.M. 2793 (2d Cir. 1969); NLR.B v.

Operating Eng'rs Local 138, 74 L.R.R.M. 2172 (Special Master 1970). The rule has been
widely endorsed for use in Board proceedings. See NLRB v. Vapor Blast Mfg. Co., 287
F.2d 402, 407 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 823 (1961); Raser Tanning Co. v. NLRB,
276 F.2d 80, 81-83 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 363 US. 830 (1960); NLRB v. Chambers Mfg.
Co., 278 F.2d 715, 716 (5th Cir. 1960); NLRB v. Central Okla. Milk Producers Ass'n,
285 F.2d 495, 498 (10th Cr. 1960); NLRB v. Laborers Local 1140, 78 L.R.R.M. 2635
(Special Master 1971).
121 See Intertype Co. v. NLRB, 401 F.2d 41, 45 (4th Cir. 1968).
122 408 F.2d 803 (5th Cir. 1969).
123 NLRB v. Chambers Mfg. Co., 278 F.2d 715, 716 (5th Cir. 1960).
124 See text and notes at notes 7-8 supra.
125 See text and note at note 19 supra.
126 Memorandum, supra note 19.
127 Id. Evidence of the effect of the Memorandum is equivocal. See note 9 supra. The
increased use of contempt appears to have been stimulated earlier, in 1964.

1972]

Taft-Hartley Contemnors

a ceiling on the number of cases the Office of the General Counsel is
presently capable of handling and that the few cases filed are not
prosecuted in the most efficient manner.
The Board has never really deployed a separate section to meet the
demands of the contempt process. Only two supervisors in the Appellate
Court Branch are assigned on a full-time, permanent basis to the socalled Contempt Section.128 When a report arrives from a regional
office, they select at random a briefing attorney to review the report
and, eventually, to work on the case if it is decided to initiate contempt
proceedings. Attorneys are assigned to other cases in the Branch, but
the Chief of the Contempt Section does not have this authority; he must
request and persuade a briefing attorney to accept the assignment.
In deciding whether or not to accept, the briefing attorney must
weigh conflicting considerations. On the positive side, the case may involve trial work, if it reaches that stage, and this can be tempting, for
it is the only opportunity an Appellate Court Branch attorney has for
trial experience. This one positive consideration may, however, be
outweighed by several negative ones. Few contempt cases result in trials,
even when a petition has been filed. Moreover, the appellate attorney
knows that trial preparation may be time consuming, involving months
or even years, and that a contempt assignment may interfere with the
performance of his regular duties of brief writing and oral argument.
There is a substantial difference between appellate and contempt work;
in the former, an attorney is able more or less to set his own pace, while
in the latter, as in all trial work, he can never predict when he may have
to ignore everything else and concentrate exclusively on the case. And
trial preparation includes its own good measure of drudgery. In weighing these factors, the attorney cannot help but be sensitive to the lesser
importance attached by his supervisors to contempt work. Obviously,
appellate advocacy is their principal concern. If this work suffers or is
ignored, prospects for advancement may be affected and supervisors may
think that briefing attorneys involve themselves in contempt work as
an excuse to avoid brief writing. Decision making on the basis of such
considerations-impossible to substantiate but difficult to dismiss-has
no proper place in the administrative process.
One result of this procedure is that recent law school graduates are
persuaded to accept a disproportionate share of contempt assignments.
These least-experienced attorneys find themselves in the position of
reviewing contempt recommendations from the regional*offices. Even
though the two supervisors oversee their work, the initial evaluation
128

See text and notes at notes 24-28 supra.
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made by these inexperienced attorneys can have substantial influence
because of the voluminous records often accompanying regional reports.
Moreover, regardless of whether the attorney persuaded to take
the contempt case is a new recruit or a veteran of the Appellate Court
Branch, it is likely that his skills lie in brief writing and oral advocacy
rather than in trial work. The attorney has little basis upon which to
estimate the potential success of a case, and if the initiation of contempt
proceedings is approved, this inexperience is a continuing major problem. This difficulty is handled on an ad hoc basis. Sometimes, depending
in part on the reputation of the regional office, the Appellate Court
Branch will request that its attorney be assisted by the regional attorney
who originally investigated the case and who normally wil have had
trial experience. Sometimes a Branch supervisor or briefing attorney
with trial experience may be persuaded to handle the case.
Although this situation has not gone entirely unnoticed within the
Office of the General Counsel, attempts to relieve it have been inadequate. One suggestion has been to assign briefing attorneys exclusively to contempt work for a specified period of time-for example,
six months. This halfway measure ignores the realities of contempt
cases, which, especially when they reach the trial stage, may last for years.
And it fails to solve many of the pressing problems outlined above. The
best solution would be to create a permanent staff of attorneys assigned
exclusively to contempt work. A permanent contempt section would
be composed of experienced trial attorneys recruited primarily from
regional offices, augmented by Board attorneys desirous of full-time
assignment to contempt work. Creation of such a section would considerably ameliorate the problems discussed above, including the
inadequate analysis of regional office recommendations, the difficulties
of trial preparation, and the caliber of trial performance. Attorneys
would not be subject to conflicting and enervating demands and would
29
develop an expertise in handling contempt cases.1
Another problem that has not received sufficient attention is the
extremely limited role the Board itself plays in connection with contempt cases. As previously explained'" the Board has in large part dele129 Ways could also be found to make better use of the limited resources presently
available. Cases exist in which trials are unnecessary because the facts are settled or undisputed. The Board should renew its earlier, long-abandoned attempts to have the
courts decide these cases solely on the pleadings. Moreover, a sustained effort should be
made to persuade courts to appoint board trial examiners as masters in cases that cannot
be decided on the pleadings, since so much valuable time and energy is expended by
Board attorneys in attempting to familiarize uninitiated court-appointed masters with
elementary labor law. See text and notes at notes 183-210 infra.
180 See text and note at note 25 supra.
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gated the decision to bring contempt proceedings to the General Counsel. Although it seems clear that the Board has this power, 3 ' it is
questionable whether this delegation is prudent. The discretion of the
General Counsel is subject only to the restraint that the Board must approve his proposal to institute a contempt case. Under the present system, the Board does not pass upon cases in which the General Counsel
decides not to follow the recommendation of the regional office that contempt proceedings be instituted. This is of particular significance since
the violation of a decree is often not dear-cut; much may depend on the
interpretation of disputed facts and ambiguous language expressed
at a high level of abstraction. The General Counsel, moreover, has no
dear rules to serve as a guide in making this highly significant decision.
An inordinate degree of discretion is, therefore, reposed in one
If contempt proceedings are to become more effective, it is essential
that the Board enunciate a comprehensive policy. Either the Board
should participate more directly in the decision to file contempt petitions, or, if it continues its delegation of power to the General Counsel,
it should promulgate well-defined guidelines that will promote more
frequent resort to contempt suits.18
131 See note 27 supra.
132 The infrequency of contempt proceedings and the recent decision, embodied in
the Memorandum, supra note 19, to make "more liberal use of the contempt process,"
suggest that in the past, only the clearest violations of decrees were likely to induce
the initiation of contempt proceedings. See text and notes at notes 18-23 supra.
133 Some courts have expressed qualms about the increasing use of contempt. In NLRB
v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 196 F.2d 755, 759 (1st Cir. 1952), for example, Chief Judge
Magruder, denying a Board petition for a show cause order, commented that "[a]s
more and more employers come under enforcement decrees in such broad terms, the courts
of appeals will gradually supplant the Board as the primary trier of facts when future
unfair labor practices are alleged, if the Board elects generally to proceed as it has done
in this case, by filing a petition for adjudication in civil contempt." The implication is
that the Board, by filing more contempt cases, will subvert the administrative scheme.
This danger seems very much overstated. When the Board must choose between its own
forum and that of the courts, it is keenly aware that it cannot expect the courts to
function with the same degree of expertise and specialization that it possesses. Nor can
it expect the courts to apply legal principles not previously formulated in its own forum.
Moreover, changed circumstances frequently render decrees inapplicable, no matter how
broadly worded they may be, and present evidentiary standards and frequent reference
to a master hamper, if not thwart, the Board in contempt proceedings. See text and notes
at notes 175-210 infra. The Board has been entrusted with primary responsibility in the
regulation of labor relations. The decision to institute contempt proceedings is properly
a matter within the Board's discretion, Amalgamated Util. Workers v. Consolidated
Edison Co., 809 U.S. 261 (1940), and the Board's decision is entitled to respect, NLRB v.
Warren Co., 350 U.S. 107 (1955).
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A. Judicial Reluctance to Invoke the Contempt Power
The courts at times manifest a reluctance to hold respondents in
contempt, even though the evidence for such a finding is sufficient. 13
One court, for example, expressed its concern that the parties to a civil
contempt proceeding would not be accorded the "broad evidentiary
rights created by Section 10(b) of the Act... -'in any such proceedings
[before the Board] the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or
equity shall not be controlling.' "135 The court also went on to reach
the surprising conclusion that a company, originally found to have
violated the Act by showing favoritism to a union with which it did not
have a union security agreement, was not in contempt of the resultant
decree when it thereafter showed favoritism to a union with which it
had such an agreement, finding the later conduct to be "essentially
different in kind"'1 6 from that proscribed by the decree.
The courts have frequently emphasized the seriousness of a civil
contempt citation and have often declined, as a discretionary matter,
s
to find a respondent in contempt. In NLRB v. Standard Trouser Co., 7

for example, the Fourth Circuit indicated that "[c]ontempt of court is
indeed a very grave thing and we are not disposed to make strained and
extreme construction[s] ... in order to spell out some theoretical and
8
abstract violation of the court's order, with facts such as are before us."'3
The dismissal of Board allegations of postdecree section 8(a)(1) and
8(a)(3) violations was based upon credibility findings of the special
master, who accepted blanket disavowals of the acts alleged and the
defense that five union leaders had been discharged solely because of
poor productivity.
More recently, the Fourth Circuit in NLRB v. Heck's, Inc.139 adopted

a technical and narrow view of its original decree when the respondent
repeated the violations in other stores in its chain. The decree, to which
the Board and company had consented, required the company to cease
and desist from interrogating employees about their union activities
and from "in any like or related manner interfering with, restraining
or coercing its employees in the exercise of their rights under the
134 For examples of lenience in criminal contempt proceedings--arguably easier to
justify-see NLRB v. Hod Carriers Local 210, 228 F.2d 589 (2d Cir. 1955); NLR.B v.
Berkley Mach. & Foundry Works, 189 F.2d 904 (4th Cir. 1951).
135 NLRB v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 106 F.2d 867, 871 (9th Cir. 1939).
136 Id.

137 162 F.2d 1012 (4th Cir. 1947).
138 Id. at 1015.
139 388 F.2d 668 (4th Cir. 1967).
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Act." 140 It was also required that the usual notice incorporating the
routine broad cease-and-desist order be posted at the store where the
violations occurred. Ignoring the broad order aimed at ending violations by the company, the court seized upon the fact that the posting
was limited to the one store and refused to find the company in con4
tempt 1 '
The defense of "good faith" has sometimes led a court not to adjudicate a respondent in contempt.142 As the court stated in NLRB v.
BrashearFreight Lines143 after finding a clear violation of the affirma140 Id. at 669.
141 Cf. NLRB v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 353 F.2d 76 (5th Cir. 1965). See also NLRB v.
Building Serv. Employees Local 254, 376 F.2d 131 (lst Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Shannon, 229
F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1956). The court in Heck's relied on FED. R. Crv. P. 65(d), which specifies
that every injunctive order "shall be specific in terms; shall describe in reasonable detail,
and not by reference to the complaint or other document, the act or acts sought to be restrained .... " The decree, however, appears to have been sufficiently specific, as it was
clearly not too vague to be understood. The court also cited NLRB v. Express Publishing
Co., 312 U.S. 426 (1941). Express Publishing, however, stands for the proposition that a
Board order may not enjoin violations of all provisions of the Act merely because a
violation of one section has been found and that to justify an order restraining other
violations, it must appear that they bear some resemblance to that which the respondent
has committed. The Board order as enforced by the court decree in Heck's clearly complied
with this requirement. More on point is Communications Workers v. NLRB, 362 U.S.
479 (1960). See Jaffe, The JudicialEnforcement of Administrative Orders, 76 lA-v. L. REv.
865, 890 (1963).
Broad orders, of course, can create a problem in that they may not identify a respondent's misconduct with sufficient particularity to lay a solid foundation for a subsequent
contempt adjudication. See Gross, Cullen, & Hanslowe, Good Faith in Labor Negotiations:
Tests and Remedies, 53 CoRmELL L. REV. 1009, 1020-21 (1968). Narrowly drawn orders,
however, are not feasible, characteristic, or desirable. To be effective, orders must be
worded in terms repeating or paraphrasing broad statutory language. See, e.g., NLR.B v.
Nickey Chevrolet Sales, Inc., 76 L.R.R.M. 2849 (7th Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Teamsters Local
282, 428 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1970); NLRB v. International Shoe Corp., 423 F-2d 503 (1st Cir.
1970). Orders limited to proscribing only specific acts would be circumvented with relative
ease. Cf. McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 192-93 (1949); NLRB v. Kohler
Co., 351 F.2d 789, 806-07 (D.C. Cir. 1965). As to the circumstances in which a court should
not find a respondent in contempt of a relatively broad decree, see NLRB v. Building Serv.
Employees Local 254, 376 F.2d 131 (1st Cir. 1967). Such limited orders would also require
more time-consuming administrative proceedings. Professor Jaffe has demonstrated that
the duty to bargain is enforced by, and can be enforced only by, employing such broad
orders. See Jaffe, supra at 881.
142 See, eg., NLRB v. Corsicana Cotton Mills, 178 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1949); NLRB v.
Brashear Freight Lines, Inc., 127 F.2d 198 (8th Cir. 1942). These cases are more indicative
of an attitude than of anything else. In the former, the court ordered the respondent to
repair its violation of the decree; in the latter, the court deferred final action on the con-

tempt petition, ordering the respondent to retreat from its position and to bargain in
good faith. In effect, the respondents in these cases were afforded further opportunity for
delay. See text and notes at notes 164-66 infra. See also NLR1B v. Aldora Mills, 197 F.2d
265 (5th Cir. 1952), discussed in text at notes 151, 153-54 infra.
143 127 F.2d 198 (8th Cir. 1942).
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tive command of its decree, "[t]he record does not show a contemptuous
attitude by the respondent, nor does it disclose any purpose to obstruct
the administration of justice. It has apparently acted in entire good
faith. In these circumstances, we are not disposed to impose any pen44
alty."
It has long been recognized, however, that unless the acts alleged to
be violative of the decree are ambiguous, intent is generally not a factor
in civil contempt. 145 In the past few years, it appears that the courts of
appeals have shown increasing willingness to affirm this principle. 14 In
NLRB v. Fairview Hospital,147 the respondent and its executive directress were found in contempt of an order to reinstate a former employee.
The defense was that the employee, an orderly, "had been breaking into
the medicine room and stealing drugs and that he had sexual relations
with hospital personnel on hospital premises" and that "the retention
of the employee constitute[d] a hazard to the operation of the hospital
and . . . [was] inimical to the welfare, mental health and treatment of
the patients."' 4 But the court deferred to the master's findings that
these reasons were not the real grounds for the discharge, noting that
"the existence of valid grounds for punitive action is no defense unless
such action was predicated solely on these grounds .... "1 49 The court
refused to consider the contention that there should be no contempt
decree because the directress had acted in good faith solely to protect
the best interests of the patients in the hospital.
Judicial resistance to the Board's utilization of contempt proceedings
reached its zenith in two refusal-to-bargain cases, NLRB v. Norfolk
Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp.15 0 and NLRB v. Aldora Mills.'5 ' In the
former case, the court declined to issue a show cause order upon the fi.ing of the Board's petition, instead setting down the motion for hearing.
The court was of the opinion that its process in contempt proceedings
"should not be used as an adjunct of collective bargaining but should
issue only when there was probable cause to believe that parties had in
144 Id. at 200.
.145 See McComb

v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187 (1949); In Re Winn-Dixie
Stores, Inc., 386 F.2d 309 (5th Cir. 1967); West Tex. Util. Co. v. NLRB, 206 F.2d 442 (D.C.
Cir. 1958); NLRB v. Lawley, 182 F.2d 798 (5th Cir. 1950); NLRB v. Whittier Mills Co.,
123 F.2d 725 (5th Cir. 1941).
146 See, e.g., NLRB v. Crown Laundry & Dry Cleaners, 437 F.2d 290 (5th Cir. 1971);
NLRB v. Fairview Hosp., 433 F.2d 1217 (7th Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Ralph Printing
& Lithographing Co., 433 F.2d 1058 (8th Cir. 1970).
147 443 F.2d 1217 (7th Cir. 1971).
148 Id. at 1218.
149 Id. at 1219.
150 195 F.2d 632 (4th Cir. 1952).
151 197 F.2d 265 (5th Cir. 1952).
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fact been guilty of real contempt of court."' 5 2 The court in Aldora
Mills, reiterating this language,5 3 found no probable cause to assert that
the employer had contumaciously refused to bargain in good faith
since the employer had reason to believe, on the basis of notifications
from its employees, that the union had lost its majority. But the Board
had refused to entertain a decertification petition, and the same court
had previously decided in NLRB v. Sanson Hosiery Mills'" that an
employer has no authority to decide whether a certified union has lost
its support. The court distinguished Sanson Hosiery Mills on the dubious ground that "it was an enforcement, not a contempt proceeding,
and that what was said and held there was intended to apply, and did
apply, only to the facts of the proceeding for enforcement then under
review."' 5 5 It emphasized that the company had "acted in the utmost
good faith and in the sound belief ... that it was proper under the
act and our decree" for it to refuse to bargain. 56
A ldora Mills was followed in NLRB v. Warren Co., 57 the court declaring that "the board is not entitled to a contempt order enforcing
the court's decree, if, in the court's opinion, such a contempt adjudication will result in a violation of the act and of the public policy for
which it stands."' 5 8 The Supreme Court, however, reversed, 15 9 holding
that it was "the statutory duty of the Court of Appeals on petition of
the Board to adjudge [the company] in contempt of its enforcement
decree."' 60 The Court continued:
That Act contemplates cooperation between the Board and the
Courts of Appeals both at the enforcement and the contempt stages
in order to effectuate its purposes. It consigns certain statutory
functions to each, and where the Board has acted properly within
its designated sphere, the court is required to grant enforcement
of the Board's order. The decree, like the order it enforces, is aimed
at the prevention of unfair labor practices, an objective of the Act,
and so long as compliance is not forthcoming that objective is frustrated. It is for this reason that Congress gave the judicial remedy
of contempt as the ultimate sanction to secure compliance with
Board orders. The grantingor withholding of such remedial action
152 195 F.2d at 634.
153 197 F.2d at 267.
'54 195 F.2d 850 (5th Cir. 1952).
'55

197 F.2d at 267.

156 Id.
'57 214 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1954), rev'd, 350 U.S. 107 (1955).
158 Id. at 485.

159 350 US. 107 (1955).
160 Id. at 112.
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is not wholly discretionary with the court. This is true not only
under the National Labor Relations Act but also under general
principles of equity jurisprudence. 61
The Supreme Court's decision in Warren is certainly authority for
the proposition that reluctance to adjudicate a respondent in contempt
of a court-enforced Board order is a very serious matter and is to be
eschewed. Since a contempt proceeding is the truly effective enforcement stage in the prevention of unfair labor practices, barriers to its
use thwart effectuation of the national labor policy. The consequences
of a civil contempt adjudication are neither so dreadful nor severe as
suggested by the judicial homilies on the subject. Sanctions are primarily
prospective; fines are often merely compensatory. 162 And a respondent
in doubt as to the limits of its freedom to act under a decree can always
request the court to modify the decree to clarify its terms.'
Refusal to resort to contempt inevitably means control over the
alleged contemnor's activities will be exercised only through Board
unfair labor practice proceedings. Professor Jaffe has pointed out that
a respondent's likelihood of prevailing actually decreases if this route
is taken.'14 Delay is the real advantage a respondent secures from a
failure to exercise the contempt power. Instead of the "three bites at
the apple" permitted under the statutory framework, 65 the alleged
contemnor may succeed in consuming the fruit before the labor law is
enforced.168

Taft-Hartley contempt proceedings involve concerns in addition to
those typical of civil or, for that matter, criminal contempt proceedings. 16 7 Civil contempt actions are normally instituted to protect the
rights of private parties; this purpose, although present to some degree
in Board-initiated proceedings, is not primary. The beneficiary of a
161 Id. at 112-13 (emphasis added, footnotes omitted).
162 See text and notes at notes 58-65 supra.
163

See McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 192 (1949); Regal Knitwear Co.

v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 9, 15 (1945). See also NLRB v. Die Supply Corp., 77 L.R.R.M. 2188

(Ist Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Mastro Plastics Corp., 261 F.2d 147 (2d Cir. 1958). Even the
party protected by the decree may be able to obtain clarification. See United Steelworkers
v. NLRB, 889 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir. 1967). But as to a Board request, see NLRB v. Athens

Mfg. Co., 163 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1947).
164 Jaffe, supra note 141, at 884.
165 That is, hearings before the Board, enforcement proceedings before the court, and
contempt proceedings.
166 For example, when a court ordered back pay to dischargees in May, 1964, it was
inexcusable for a respondent to be permitted to delay making payment until held in civil
contempt in June, 1971. See NLRB v. Indianapolis Transit Mix Corp., 77 L.R.R.M. 3082
(2d Cir. 1971).
167 See Note, The Role of Contempt Proceedings in Enforcing Orders of the NLRB, 54

CoLum. L. Rav. 603 (1954).
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Taft-Hartley decree may not initiate contempt proceedings under present law, 168 and intervention has not been permitted, even with the
Board's approval. 1609 Since the role of the Board in contempt proceedings is to enforce the national labor policy, 170 these proceedings should
be designed and conducted to facilitate the enforcement of that policy.
At present, this is not done. The legal standards of proof, the habitual
assignment to masters, and the failure to utilize the Board's expertise
combine to thwart this goal.
The civil contempt proceeding should serve in part to declare the
law embedded in the decree. Although the courts have discretion in
special circumstances not to invoke the contempt power, 7 1 the discretion must be exercised sparingly. This lesson is not one for the courts
alone; the Board has frequently been reluctant to bring cases in which
the courts could exercise the declaratory function. An excellent illustration is United Steelworkers v. NLRB (H. K. Porter),.72 involving a
controversy over the interpretation of a court-enforced Board order.
The union asserted that the company had been ordered to agree to a
contractual dues checkoff provision, but the company interpreted the
decree as ordering it merely to negotiate in good faith concerning some
procedure for the collection of dues on employer premises--for example, by stewards during nonworking hours. The union moved for a
clarification of the decree, but the court denied the motion and "invited
the Board to test the competing interpretations of the decree through
its contempt process."'173 The union requested the initiation of contempt
proceedings, but the Board refused. Only then did the court grant the
74
union's motion to clarify the decree.'
168 Amalgamated Util. Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309 U.S. 261 (1940); see text
and notes at notes 73-80 supra.
169 NLRB v. Kohler Co., 351 F.2d 798 (D.C. Cir. 1965). See also NLRB v. Shurtenda
Steaks, Inc., 424 F.2d 192 (10th Cir. 1970). For a discussion concerning intervention, see
text and notes at notes 96-113 supra.
170 See Amalgamated Util. Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309 U.S. 261, 269 (1940).
171 See, e.g., NLR.B v. Building Serv. Employees Local 254, 376 F.2d 131 (1st Cir. 1967).
172 389 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir. 1967). Upon remand, since the company's opposition to
checkoff was based solely upon its desire to thwart consummation of a collective bargaining agreement, it was ordered to agree to a checkoff provision. 172 N.L.R.B. No. 72, 68
L.R.R.M. 1337 (1968), enforced, 414 F.2d 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1969). The Supreme Court later
reversed, holding that it was ultra vires for the Board to compel agreement to a substantive contractual provision. 897 U.S. 99 (1970).
173 389 F.2d at 298.
174 The court adopted the company's interpretation that it was bound to bargain with
the union only as to some arrangement for dues collection. The court clearly stated,
however, that the Board was empowered in certain instances to order an employer to
grant a checkoff system.
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Standards of Proof

The Eighth Circuit has accurately described the standards of proof
applied in Taft-Hartley contempt proceedings:
The rule as to quantum of evidence in civil contempt proceedings
is in no way affected by the situation that such proceeding is
in connection with an enforcement decree of an order of the
Board ....
The rule is that contempt need not be shown beyond a reasonable doubt but that something more than a bare preponderance of
evidence is necessary ... This Court has stated that a "degree of
certainty" is required which leaves no fair ground of doubt....
Other courts of appeals have expressed the rule as requiring dear
and convincing proof.... Whatever qualifying adjective may be
used in the various opinions, they are unanimous that a heavy
burden of proof rests upon the party urging contempt. 175
Insistence on the "clear and convincing proof" standard in civil contempt proceedings promotes results that are paradoxical when viewed
in the context of the regulatory framework. This standard is, of course,
more stringent than the "preponderance of testimony" standard that the
Board must apply in determining whether unfair labor practices have
been committed.176 The result of the varying standard of proof is that
conduct that would be found in a Board hearing to violate the terms of
the decree may not be found contumacious in a contempt proceeding. 177
This makes for uncertain enforcement of the national labor policy and
a diminution of the authority of the court decree.
The consequences of application of the stricter standard are illustrated most graphically in cases in which the Board's expertise and specialization might play an important, if not decisive, role. Refusal-tobargain cases are frequently of this kind, and a survey of contempt cases
bears this out. Through 1970, of the twenty-six reported contempt cases
lost by the Board, fourteen involved an alleged refusal to bargain; of
the fifty reported cases in which the Board prevailed, twenty-two concerned this issue. Thus, while forty-four percent of the contempt cases
won by the Board were refusal-to-bargain cases, fifty-four percent of the
175 Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. NLRB, 137 F.2d 77, 79 (8th Cir. 1943) (citations
omitted). See also NLRB v. Nickey Chevrolet Sales, Inc., 76 L.R.R.M. 2849 (7th Cir.
1971); NLRB v. Standard Trouser Co., 162 F.2d 1012 (4th Cir. 1947); NLRB v. Tupelo
Garment Co., 122 F.2d 603 (5th Cir. 1941).
176 National Labor Relations Act § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970). It may be true that
different standards of proof are mere verbal formulae and that use of one standard as
opposed to another might not affect the outcome of most cases. Use of the "preponderance" standard by the courts, however, might create a judicial mood favoring findings of
contempt and influence decisions in close cases.
177 Cf. Jaffe, supra note 141, at 917-18.
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cases that were lost dealt with this purported violation. The implication of these statistics is borne out by further examination. Of the
twenty-two cases the Board has won, fifteen were decided without
reference to a special master on the basis of the pleadings and oral argument.178 Violations of law were dear.179 But the Board tends to lose
contempt cases involving bargaining orders in which it argues that the
180
violation is a sophisticated evasion of the decree.
It is inevitable that the courts will decide some questions of law and
fact with which the Board is more familiar and that are better handled,
ceteris paribus, at the administrative level. 81 Unfortunately, this phenomenon of judicial adjudication by application of standards of proof
differing from those governing the administrative determinations encourages attempts to evade court decrees by those who would profit by
the difference, thus subverting the established administrative frame82
work.
178 NLRB v. Warren Co., 350 U.. 107 (1955); NLRB v. Merrill, 414 F.2d 1323 (10th
Cir. 1969); NLRB v. Savoy Laundry, 354 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Vander Wal,
316 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1963); NLRB v. F.M. Reeves & Sons, 273 F.2d 710 (10th Cir. 1961);
Carpinteria Lemon Ass'n v. NLRB, 274 F.2d 492 (9th Cir. 1960); NLRB v. Shannon,
229 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1956); West Tex. Util. Co. v. NLRB, 206 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir. 1953);
NLRB v. Israel Putnam Mills, 197 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1952); NLRB v. Star Metal Mfg. Co.,
187 F.2d 856 (3d Cir. 1951); Great S. Trucking Co. v. NLRB, 139 F.2d 984 (4th Cir. 1944);
NLRB v. Knoxville Publishing Co., 124 F.2d 875 (6th Cir. 1942); NLRB v. Boss Mfg. Co.,
118 F.2d 187 (7th Cir. 1941); Bussmann Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 111 F.2d 783 (8th Cir. 1940)
(per curiam); NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 110 F.2d 632 (4th Cir. 1940).
179 In NLRB v. F.M. Reeves & Sons, 273 F.2d 710 (10th Cir. 1961), the company
granted unilateral wage increases during negotiations and insisted on a performance bond.
In NLRB v. Merrill, 414 F.2d 1323 (10th Cir. 1969), the employer had attended only one
bargaining session-for a portion of one day-in the period of four and one-half months
after the enforcement decree; it then broke off bargaining, claiming a good faith doubt
as to the union's majority status. In NLRB v. Israel Putnam Mills, 197 F.2d 116 (2d Cir.
1952), the employer met with the union representatives, but solely to inform them that
it was intransigent, even concerning "non-monetary matters." In Great S. Trucking Co.
v. NLRB, 139 F.2d 984 (4th Cir. 1944), the employer sought to justify its refusal to
bargain on the ground that the union had lost its majority status-after the decree had
been entered but before the company took the remedial action required. And in NLRB v.

Star Metal Mfg. Co., 187 F.2d 856 (3d Cir. 1951), the respondents admitted being in
civil contempt and also pleaded guilty to criminal contempt.
180 E.g., NLRB v. Laney & Duke Warehouse Co., 424 F.2d 109 (5th Cir. 1970). See W.B.
Johnston Grain Co. v. NLRB, 411 F.2d 1215 (10th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. American Aggregate Co., 335 F.2d 253 (5th Cir. 1964); NLRB v. Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp.,
195 F.2d 632 (4th Cir. 1952); cf. NLRB v. Johnson Mfg. Co., 80 L.R.R.M. 2012 (5th Cir.
1972) (company held in contempt, contrary to master's findings, on ground that clear
and convincing evidence supported Board contention that postdecree proposals and
positions paralleled surface bargaining proscribed in enforcement decree).
181 See Jaffe, supra note 141, at 881.
182 For a discussion of the perils attendant on the resulting "shift in primary jurisdiction," see Note, supra note 167, at 607.
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Selection and Role of Special Masters

The utilization of the special master by the courts of appeals has
proven to be another major problem area. 18 3 The lack of labor relations
expertise and specialization on the part of most special masters, together
with the policy predilections of many, have hampered if not thwarted
Taft-Hartley enforcement. Taken in conjunction with the stringent
proof requirements imposed upon the Board as the petitioner, 18 4 this
factor severely debilitates the contempt process.
For the standard to review findings of the master, the courts have
looked to rule 53(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 18 5
which provides that "[i]n an action to be tried without a jury the court
shall accept the master's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous."'' 1 6
Reliance has been placed upon the traditional path of words that the
master, "who saw and heard the witnesses and could observe their
demeanor while testifying, is in a better position than a court to pass on
the credibility of witnesses."' 187 Yet the soundness of according this degree of finality to a master's findings is highly questionable. Much
depends on the identity of the master, but the Board has been lax in
dealing with this critical question, typically suggesting a district court
judge or a trial examiner from some other federal agency. 188 The master
is thus likely not to be a specialized expert in the field of labor law,
even though he is called upon to resolve controversies of the kind normally decided by the Board--disputes in which subtle questions of labor
law and fact are interwoven.
183 See text and notes at notes 84-35 supra.
t84
See text and notes at notes 175-77 supra.
185 FEn. R. Civ. P. 53(e)(2).
186 NLRB v. Ralph Printing & Lithographing Co., 433 F.2d 1058, 1063 (8th Cir. 1970);
W.B. Johnston Grain Co. v. NLRB, 411 F.2d 1215, 1217 (10th Cir. 1969); NLR.B v. Alamo
Express, 395 F.2d 481, 482 (5th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Standard Trouser Co., 162 F.2d 1012,
1014 (4th Cir. 1947); Polish Nat'l Alliance v. NLR.B, 159 F.2d 38, 89 (7th Cir. 1946); NLRB
v. Arcade-Sunshine Co., 132 F.2d 8 (D.C. Cir. 1942); NLR.B v. Remington Rand, 130 F.2d
919, 925 (2d Cir. 1942). Cf. NLRB v. Giannasca, 119 F.2d 756, 758 (2d Cir. 1941):
Certainly the evidence permitted that conclusion, and if the master had found the
opposite, we should have affirmed him. The issue of bad faith is always difficult to
decide; it is seldom possible to be sure of another's state of mind, and the findings of
the tribunal of first instance should be especially cogent. We cannot find such a
clear preponderance in the case at bar as to overrule the master upon this point.
For a recent case in which a court rejected a master's findings, see NLRB v. Johnson Mfg.
Co., 80 L.L.R.M. 2012 (5th Cir. 1972).
187 NLRB v. Standard Trouser Co., 162 F.2d 1012, 1014 (4th Cir. 1947); see NLRB v.
Hod Carriers Local 210, 228 F.2d 589, 592 (2d Cir. 1955); NLRB v. Arcade-Sunshine Co.,
132 F.2d 8 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
188 From 1966 through 1969, twenty-eight cases were referred to masters. These masters
consisted of thirteen federal district judges, eleven trial examiners (U.S. Civil Service
Commission), two local attorneys, one senior federal circuit judge, one former state court
judge, and one law school dean. Compiled from NLRB ANN. RaE.
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Judge Clark, speaking for the Second Circuit in NLRB v. Giannasca,5 9 forcefully expressed the dangers in committing excessive responsibility to masters:
Experience, I think, now shows that there is serious question as to
the wisdom of committing the last and perhaps most delicate step
of labor law enforcement-proceedings in contempt-to somewhat
alien professional interests as in effect a court of first instance. I
suggest that so to do is unfair to the dignity of this court in maintaining respect for its orders and to the public interest which we
are to safeguard. If the Board acts in a public capacity to give effect
to the declared policies of the act, . . .so obviously do we also.

Further, we lose the very quality of expertness and exercise of wise
discretion in difficult and troubled situations which is the essential
basis for committal of such matters to agency control ....

More-

over, the long wait while the new tribunal is familiarizing itself
with the law and the facts--here delaying settlement of an active
labor dispute for a year after seeming agreement, though the underlying facts were substantially undisputed-underlines perhaps the
chief problem of administrative procedure, that of delay in effective action. 90
Although Judge Clark's position has been rejected elsewhere,' 9 ' its
relevance remains undiminished, and its correctness cannot be gainsaid.
Judge Clark suggested that the "trained examining staff of the Board
itself" be directed to take testimony in contempt proceedings, subject
to the court's review of "the trend and effect of the testimony."' 92 This
proposal, which would avoid the problem of the special master's lack
of expertise and specialization, has been almost completely ignored by
both the Board and the courts.
There is no statutory restriction upon a court's discretionary power
in choosing a special master. The only objection to the appointment of
uninvolved trial examiners assigned to the Board-that they might
have a pro-Board animus-is not a serious one and is far outweighed
by the countervailing consideration that Board examiners are highly
189 119 F.2d 756 (2d Cir. 1941).
190 Id. at 759.
191 See, e.g., NLRB v. SatiUa Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 393 F.2d 134, 186 (5th Cir.
1968):
The special master over the board's objection, found that the subsequent pay raises
granted after the respondent considered negotiations at an end, were not a separate
violation of the judgment of this court as being in bad faith. While, if we were
passing on the motives and intent of the parties as the finder of facts, we might, as
we do, say that in light of the whole proceedings, the company's conduct with respect
to the granting of the pay raises was suspiciously like an effort to minimize the value
of the union, we cannot determine that the findings of the special master in this
regard were wholly erroneous.
102 119 F.2d at 759.
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skilled triers of fact and enjoy the expertise required to deal with the
subtleties of a highly specialized field. There is no basis for assuming
the existence of bias on the part of Board examiners not previously involved in the case, and appellate court review would provide an adequate safeguard. Although the Board in its memorandum in Corning
Glass Works v. NLRB193 objected to referral of compliance questions
to the Board itself on the ground that this would destroy the adversary
relationship between the Board and the respondent, this objection does
not apply to referral of such questions to a Board trial examiner. 194
If Board examiners are able to render decisions without bias, the
adversary relationship between Board and respondent would be preserved and the impartiality and integrity of the decision-making process
maintained.
Another alternative is appointment of labor law or labor relations
professors or professional labor arbitrators. Although this proposal has
the merits of combining expertise with impartiality, it has seldom been
urged by the Board.
Only once has a court remanded a contempt case to the Board instead
of appointing a special master or deciding the case on the pleadings.
In NLRB v. Retail Clerks International Association,9 5 the court directed the Board to take testimony and to make findings on what the
court termed "the primary and controlling fact issue raised on the contempt proceeding." 196 This issue was whether "location managers" had
been intended to be included within the category of "supervisory employees" in a consent decree entered into between the Board and the
97
union.
In remanding this question for determination by the Board, the
court limited the reach of its decision in several respects. First, it noted
193 129 F.2d 967 (2d Cir. 1942).
194 There continues to be a controversy over the "independence" of trial examiners,
and perhaps the office should be strengthened with respect to compensation and tenure.
Even if it is assumed that the Supreme Court's approval of Civil Service Commission
regulations governing examiners in Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners Conference, 45
U.S. 128 (1953), may have gone "a long way toward frustrating the purposes of Congress
[in enacting the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 551-59 (1967, Supp. 1972)]

to give examiners independence," id. at 144 (Black, J., dissenting), the present system still
more than adequately assures that NLRB examiners are sufficiently "independent" of
the agency to serve as masters in contempt proceedings. See 2 K.C. DAVIs, ADmis

Tmr

INSTATIVE LAW:
LAw TREATISE ch. 10 (1958, Supp. 1970); W. GELHoRN & C. BYsE, A
CASES AND CommNTs, 884-88 (5th ed. 1970); L. JAF-E & N. NATHANsoN, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAw: CAsm AND MATEIALS, 1026-29 (3d ed. 1968).

195 186 F.2d 371 (9th Cir. 1951), enforced, 203 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1953), reconsidered and

reaf'd on the merits, 211 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1954).
196 203 F.2d at 167.
197 186 F.2d at 371.

1972]

Taft-Hartley Contemnors

that the fact that the underlying decree was based upon a stipulation
of the parties made it a particularly appropriate case for remand. Second,
it stressed that the record was devoid of evidence that would throw
light on the crucial issue. 198 Third, it made clear that a remand is "not
usual in a contempt proceeding" and added that "[t]he findings of the
Board in the supplementary proceeding before it should in any case be
accepted with caution." 19 9 Although the court commented rather defensively that "[w]e do not say that the course we have taken here will
or should be followed in all cases of this nature," it did state that "there
should be some flexibility" in the general rule that the Board should
not have any decision-making role in a contempt proceeding. 200 Emphasizing, moreover, that the power of punishment remained with
itself, the court rejected the argument that "reference of questions to
the Board in a contempt proceeding would in effect be entrusting to
the Board enforcement of its own order."2 01 Finally, the court denied
that it would be bound to follow the findings of the Board if supported
by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole.
The major problem with the opinion is its vagueness concerning
when and in what manner the court should exercise its discretion to
remand to the Board. It does suggest, however, that "there is reason for
taking such a course where the single fact question involved is one
202
with which the Board is eminently equipped and qualified to deal."
198 Id.
199 203 F.2d at 168-69.
200

Id.

201 Id. at 168-69 n.2.
202 Id. at 168. It would appear that the court was not limiting this procedure to cases

involving a single factual question, but the court's position is at best ambiguous. The
procedure to which the court resorted in this case is reminiscent of the interlocutory
order procedure articulated by Judge Learned Hand in NLRB v. New York Merchandise
Co., 134 F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1943). The latter case was decided two years after NLRB v.
Giannasca, 119 F.2d 756 (2d Cir. 1941), and the questions which Judge Clark had found
disturbing in Giannasca still went unanswered. Judge Hand thought that he had found
a means of avoiding the problem:
If the practice which we have outlined above is followed, references to masters upon
true proceedings to punish employers for contempt will be likely either to disappear,
or to be short and few, for the Board will have decided all the issues as the initial
tribunal, as it should. Contumacy of the enforcement order will be extremely rare.
134 F.2d at 953. The interlocutory order procedure is called into play when the Board
defers issuing a remedial order (e.g., back pay or reinstatement orders as in NLRB v.
New York Merchandise Co., supra) until after its order to cease and desist from an
unfair labor practice has been enforced. This initial enforcement order "cannot . . .
support a proceeding to punish for contempt" based upon a failure to take the proper
remedial measures since "it is cardinal . ..that no one shall be punished for the disobedience of an order which does not definitely prescribe what he is to do." Id. at 952.
The order is final only "as to any of its other provisions that require no further definition," id.; only in that case is a contempt proceeding appropriate. The initial enforcement
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Some courts, perhaps recognizing the disrupting and distorting impact wrought by an ill-equipped master, have explicitly restricted his
responsibilities. 203 Other courts, though, paying lip service to the
"clearly erroneous" standard, have nonetheless avoided it either by
concluding that the master's findings were "clearly erroneous," 20 ' by
overruling the master without such an express characterization,2 05 or
by correcting the master's application of the law to the facts. 206 Closer
judicial scrutiny of the master has thus become more prevalent in recent
years. But this is not an adequate solution to the problem. "Clearly
erroneous" is too flexible a standard for this sensitive area; that which
exceeds the criterion for some judges will not for others, and the fundamental difficulties raised by the identity of the master remain unresolved. One might suppose that no problems exist with respect to
conclusions of law since the courts are not bound by any requirement
of deference to the master. But this assumption is unrealistic since no
order is said to be interlocutory. Although this procedure is productive of delay since it

can easily be taken advantage of by a recalcitrant respondent, Judge Hand thought that it
"should involve no greater delay than to proceed through a master as for contempt." Id.
Judge Hand's approach has helped to avoid in contempt proceedings the raising of difficult fact questions regarding remedial decrees that would require reference to a special
master. As long as the distinction between provisions that are definite and provisions
that need to be explicated further is not rigidly and dogmatically maintained, the procedure should be implemented, for it preempts for the Board much that might otherwise
be considered in a contempt proceeding. But doctrinaire and unimaginative adherence to
the distinction has led to at least one instance of prolonged evasion of a decree. See, e.g.,
NLRB v. Deena Artware, Inc., 198 F.2d 645 (6th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 906
(1953), contempt show cause order denied, 207 F.2d 798 (6th Cir. 1953), petition to adjudge
in contempt dismissed, 261 F.2d 503 (6th Cir. 1958), rev'd, 361 U.S. 398 (1960), motions
for discovery granted, 310 F.2d 470 (6th Cir. 1962). For a perceptive discussion of this case
in particular, the interlocutory order procedure in general, and the dangers of an inflexible
approach, see Jaffe, supra note 141, at 903-14.
203 In NLRB v. Weirton Steel Co., 146 F.2d 144, 145 (3d Cir. 1944), the court foreclosed the master from recommending conclusions of law, stating that "[t]hat is a responsibility which rests upon the Court and which we shall assume and discharge." In
NLRB v. Red Arrow Freight Lines, 193 F.2d 979 (5th Cir. 1952), the master was instructed
to take testimony, but was foreclosed from making conclusions even of fact. The Board
in both cases had alleged employer domination of a union.
204 See, e.g., NLRB v. Nickey Chevrolet Sales, Inc., 76 L.R.R.M. 2849 (7th Cir. 1971);
NLRB v. My Store, Inc., 345 F.2d 494 (7th Cir. 1968).
205 See, e.g., NLRB v. Operating Eng'rs Local 825, 430 F.2d 1225 (3d Cir. 1970); NLRB
v. American Aggregate Co., 335 F.2d 253 (5th Cir. 1964).
206 See, e.g., NLRB v. Kohler Co., 351 F.2d 798, 802-04 (D.C. Cir. 1965); NLRB v.
Berkley Mach. Works & Foundry, 189 F.2d 904, 905 (4th Cir. 1951). In the latter case, the
court stated:
While we accept the findings of the special master to the effect that respondents were
not guilty of bad faith in the sense of willful disobedience of the court's order in
their negotiations with the union, we think it clear upon the record that the
respondents have failed to bargain collectively with the union as contemplated by
the National Labor Relations Act . . .and the Labor-Management Relations Act of
1947, .. . and as the court had directed in its decree.
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clear demarcation between questions of law and fact exists. 207 Whoever
makes the findings of fact will often have practical control over the out-

208
come of the case.
Judge Clark in Giannasca concluded that if the Board examiners
were not to be utilized, there was "no other proper course than the taking of... testimony before the court itself or some of its members. 2 0 9
Although this option has actually been chosen in a few cases, 210 it seems
practicable only when a relatively limited factual inquiry is required.
Court of appeals judges are no doubt preferable to special masters. But
the average appellate court judge is not likely to possess either the wellhoned fact-finding skills of an experienced trier of fact or the labor
relations expertise and specialization of a Board trial examiner.
CONCLUSION

This examination of the Taft-Hartley contempt proceeding-the
only real sanction in the enforcement of agency orders-has demonstrated the modest resort to contempt by the NLRB and past judicial
reluctance to invoke the contempt power. In part, this is a problem
endemic to the administrative-judicial structure designed by Congress for the administration of the Act, and one result of this study
is to bolster previous recommendations for procedural reform in
labor law.211 It might be salutary, for example, to provide that Board
207 In Polish Nat'l Alliance v. NLRB, 159 F.2d 38, 39 (7th Cir. 1946), Judge Sparks,

dissenting, commented:
I am quite willing to be bound by the master's purely factual findings, but when he
concludes from those facts that appellant violated the terms of our decree, his conclusion is one of law, by which we are not bound. That, precisely, is the legal question
before us for decision, and it requires a legal interpretation of the words "substantially equivalent position."
But Judge Sparks's colleagues on the bench evidently did not agree. The majority
opinion concluded:
Ordinarily a master's findings are not to be set aside unless clearly erroneous ....
With this statement of the rule in mind, we cannot say that the master's findings
are clearly erroneous; simply because we might have reached a different conclusion is
no reason to set aside a master's report. The report of the master is therefore confirmed.
208 J. FRANK, CouaRs ON TRiAL 23, 82-33 (1949).
209 119 F.2d at 759.
210 NLRB v. Building Serv. Employees Local 256, 876 F.2d 131 (1st Cir. 1967); NLRB
v. Lambert, 250 F.2d 801 (5th Cir. 1958).
211 See Bartosic, supra note 1; Fields, 40,000 Cases (Proposalfor Five Regional Labor
Boards), 78 LAB. REL. REP. 68 (1971); Lyne, The National Labor Relations Board and
Suggested Alternatives, 22 LAB. L.J. 408 (1971); Morris, ProceduralReform in Labor LawA PreliminaryPaper, 35 J. AiR L. & Corr. 537 (1969); Shutkin, One Nation Indivisible-A
Plea for a United States Court of Labor Relations, 20 LAB. LJ. 94 (1969). According to
NLRB Chairman Miller,

there is no means that mortal men can devise which can preserve due process and
still permit a three-step judicial process (the present system) to operate with the
kind of promptness which I think necessary to really substantially improve the effec-
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orders be self-enforcing2 12 and to transfer contempt proceedings to a
labor court or the Board's own forum.
Yet significant reform in the labor law field has always been slow in
coming.218 It is thus likely that the present Board-court structure will
continue in the immediate future and that the Board will be left the
task of fashioning innovative remedies and sharpening traditional ones.
By describing and critically analyzing current Board and judicial attitudes, practices, and procedures, this article has sought to establish the
need for sharpening one remedy-the contempt proceeding-and to
determine the areas to which the whetstone should be applied.
tive administration of our statute. That is why I have been preaching for many
months now the need for a reform of our labor judiciary. That is one area in which
I opt not for continuity, but for change.
Address by NLRB Chairman Edward B. Miller before the Detroit Chapter of the Industrial Relations Research Association, Oct. 7, 1971 (copy on file at The University of Chicago Law Review).
212 See Bartosic, supra note 1, at 664; Fanning, Proposals to Speed Disposition of TaftHartley Act Cases, 75 LAB. REL. REP. 168 (1970); Report of the Committee on Labor Law
of the Federal Bar Council on Proposed Statutory Changes in NLRB Proceedings, 73
LAB. REra. REP. 263 (1970).
213 For example, Reorganization Plan No. 5 of 1961-submitted by President Kennedy
pursuant to the Reorganization Act of 1949, ch. 226, 63 STAT. 203--would have allowed
the Board to grant greater finality to trial examiner decisions in complaint cases. But the
plan was rejected by the House of Representatives. 107 CONG. REc. 13069-78 (1961).

